whether or not they pay, and hence are unlikely to
voluntarily pay in a competitive market or a in a culture
that promotes self-interest. Ecosystem structure and
mineral resources are typically excludable under
existing institutions, and can easily be converted into
market commodities. However, the ecosystem services
lost from removing structure and emitting waste are
frequently non-excludable. Markets do not compensate
for their provision or penalize for their loss. The result
is over consumption, under-provision and degradation.
This dynamic explains anthropogenic climate change,
land use conversion, biodiversity loss, and most of the
other serious problems currently faced by society.
One solution is to make the resource excludable so
that it becomes possible to ration access. It is impos-
sible to make services such as climate regulation,
disturbance regulation or protection from UV radiation
excludable, but it is generally possible to regulate or
make excludable the activities that destroy these
services. However, making something excludable
requires collective action via social institutions; it is a
prerequisite for market allocation, and not the result of
markets. If sustainability is a goal, then society must
step in to regulate access to ecosystem structure and
waste absorption capacity to ensure the adequate
provision of ecosystem services. Mainstream eco-
nomists often argue that simply establishing tradable
private property rights will automatically lead to
efficient allocation, so who receives those rights is
relatively unimportant [151, 152]. However, as we saw
above with the case of food, market allocation often
forces those with the greatest level of physiological
need for a resource to reduce consumption the most. If
we limit land use change, biodiversity loss, freshwater
and nitrogen to ecologically sustainable levels, food
prices will likely skyrocket and the poor will starve,
which is not socially sustainable. If humans do indeed
care about fairness and the well-being of others, then
price-rationing of essential resources—especially those
freely provided by nature—is inappropriate. Delib-
erative democratic processes give equal weight to
everyone's preferences, while markets weight
preferences by purchasing power. Which of these
approaches to use is about the distribution of power.
Furthermore, ubiquitous externalities rule out Pareto
efficiency as a useful criterion, since virtually all
economic activities have negative impacts on others.
But rationing access is not always a solution. Non-
rival resources are not depleted through use, and
rationing access therefore reduces benefits without
affecting costs. Such resources are not scarce in an
economic sense, as there is no need to compete for
them once they exist—though there is competition for
any rival resources that might be required to produce
or protect them. Markets are only efficient (i.e. able to
balance marginal costs with marginal benefits) for
resources that are rival. Paradoxically, the economic
surplus (the monetary value of total benefits minus
total costs) from non-rival resources is maximized at a
price of zero where anyone who wants can consume
the resource. This is especially true for clean
technologies that replace polluting ones. However, at
a price of zero, market supply is also zero. Economic
systems must still allocate resources towards the
production or protection of non-rival resources.
Private property rights to non-rival resources, (e.g.
patents) provide market incentives to supply them,
but simultaneously reduce the economic surplus they
generate. The appropriate allocation mechanism is
some form of cooperative (e.g. publicly financed)
provision that rewards innovators while making their
innovations freely available [71, 153].
Many of society's most important resources,
ranging from global climate stability and clean energy
technologies (information) to biodiversity and critical
ecosystem services, are non-rival and inherently non-
scarce, challenging the very definition of economics.
Most of these resources are also inherently non-
excludable so that rationing access is also impossible.
However, global society has been strengthening
intellectual property rights for decades, using prices to
ration access to many of the technologies required to
solve our global problems [154]. For example, if we
develop a clean, efficient, decentralized form of solar
energy, no matter how much solar energy one country
captures, there will be no less for others, and the
technology itself is likely to improve through use.
Patenting the technology and charging for it will
reduce use and hence the potential for reducing
climate change [71].
If people were inherently self-interested and
competitive, as typically modeled by orthodox eco-
nomists, then we would be forced to rely on economic
institutions that channel that behavior towards the
common good, such as markets. Behavioral sciences
however show that humans are capable of cooperation,
and can build institutions that enhance our innate
propensity for pro-social behavior. As discussed above,
markets may actually undermine cooperation.
If economists hope to contribute to sustainability
science, they must take a scientific approach to
economics that builds on insights from the physical,
life, and social sciences. Objective physical charac-
teristics of resources, not ideology, determine whether
competitive or cooperative allocation is most efficient.
Table 1 briefly describes potentially suitable mech-
anisms for allocating different types of resources.
While versions of this table are fairly standard in the
economic literature, most economists treat problems
resulting from non-excludability and non-rivalry as
market failures, externalities that should be inter-
nalized through market prices. An economics that was
more consilient with advances in other fields would
instead recognize that economic activity unavoidably
degrades the environment, environmental degradation
is one of the greatest threats to human welfare, and
most environmental problems take the form of
prisoners' dilemmas that can only be solved through
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