violence and ongoing infrastructure impediments, with
aid and the humanitarian sector helping unevenly with
some institutional shortcomings. It is difficult to assess
and appraise public confidence in the healthcare system
and confidence across religious and ethnic minorities for
the transition period from 2002 to 2011. However, the
death rate reduction and access to primary prevention
schemes found in the data table below do provide
evidence of improved institutional capacity and overall
public health improvement for the population.
The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East
Timor (FRETILIN) was formed and tried to push out
an invading Indonesia in the 1970's. The US and
Soviet Union did little to abate the Indonesian take-
over and the Secretary of State at the time, Henry
Kissinger, discussed East Timor and did not protest
the Indonesian President Suharto in reference to the
strategic Indonesian invasion and takeover in 1974
[30]. In late 1975, the UN Security Council called on
Indonesia to withdraw its troops from East Timor and
to summarily stop all acts of war and killing.
There was a prolonged war on the island until a
UN-, Portuguese- and Indonesian-backed referendum
on independence was held in 1999. A majority of
Timorese voted for independence, which was answered
with violence and conflict, and forced over 300,000 into
West Timor as Internal Displaced Peoples (IDPs) and
refugees [31]. During the violence, the entire infra-
structure, roads, homes, agricultural irrigation, water
supply systems, schools, hospitals, markets and nearly
100% of the country's electrical grid were summarily
destroyed. The destruction of 70% of the country's
infrastructure in 1999 has severely undermined Timor-
Leste's economic growth and health security. In Autumn
1999, an Australian-led peacekeeping mission, the Inter-
national Force for East Timor (INTERFET), was deployed
in the country and brought the violence to an end.
Timor-Leste joined the United Nations in 2002,
became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
in 2005 and is presently an applicant to the ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) itself. The
building of democratic institutions is growing and
development and stability are spreading organically.
There is a well-structured policy of reconciliation and
forgiveness for the atrocities committed (the Com-
mission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation;
Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação,
CAVR). Significant progress has been made in re-
unifying the country after multiple acts of violence
threatened to destabilize it, although concerns remain
about overall accountability and gender discrimination
moving forward.
For example, in early 2006, approximately 700 mili-
tary personnel petitioned President Gusmao to ad-
dress complaints of discrimination, which flared into
more street violence. There were additional deaths,
widespread destruction of property, and the continued
displacement of thousands of Dili residents, as well as
a decrease in health security; almost 10% of the
country's population became IDPs. In most complex
emergencies, public health intervention focuses on the
immediate health needs, not underlying conditions
and systemic issues [32]. This is best illustrated by
the gender based violence and maternal and ante-
natal care, which was lacking during the crisis. At the
time, there was reduced coordination, and a lack of
public health dialogue and of advocacy around sen-
sitive reproductive health issues—the need to
strengthen neglected areas and the inclusion of all
components of sexual and reproductive health provides
a foundation to respond to crises [33,34]. At this
stage, health security was at significant risk and
health infrastructure was decaying substantially; the
fragile state of Timor-Leste was teetering on state
failure.
Before such failure occurred, the Government of
Timor-Leste asked the Governments of Australia,
Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal to send security
forces to stabilize the country. In late summer 2006,
the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1704,
creating the United Nations Integrated Mission in
Timor-Leste (UNMIT). Its mandate included assisting
with the restoration of stability, rebuilding the insti-
tutions comprising the security sector, supporting the
Government of Timor-Leste in conducting presidential
and parliamentary elections, and achieving account-
ability for the crimes against humanity and other
atrocities committed in 1999 [35,36].
This mandate included a major policing unit with
shared influence and successIn early spring 2011,
UNMIT completed its handover of executive policing
authority back to the Timorese, effectively declaring
Timor-Leste's security apparatus' stable and capable
of maintaining rule of law to an international stan-
dard. Despite significant global pessimism about UN-
backed institutions and bureaucracy, the case can
made here that the fragile, near failed state of Timor-
Leste is a fledgling still moving forward with inter-
nationally recognized and UN-backed institutions,
which have focused government support and have
produced stable outcomes. Resuscitating fragile and
failed states starts with the prevention of collapse and
restructuring or supporting weak-but-still-growing in-
stitutions. In Timor-Leste the efforts made by the
Timorese and supported by the UN and coalition
countries have worked, and have met or exceeded
expectations. Similar positive trends of development
in public health infrastructure and can enable further
quantified gains to feed into a positive feedback loop
and stabilize, and can lead to broader health security
and more firmly root state stability.
Timor-Leste is not presently in a lasting state of
social unrest or violent conflict. However, its post-
conflict status and elements of fragility, combined with
only a budding democratic infrastructure, are at risk of
being pushed towards failure if further investment is
not made to secure health security for its citizens.
Timor-Leste (FSI
2012
= 28; CS
92.7
) differs from its land
19