Journal of Human Security | 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1 | Pages 32–45

DOI: 10.12924/johs2014.10010032

ISSN: 1835-3800

Research Article

A Case for Cohabitative Security: The Philippine and

Malaysian Experience

Michael I. Magcamit

College of Arts, Political Science, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand;

E-Mail: [email protected].ac.nz; Tel.: +64 3642987 ext. 6053

Submitted: 13 February 2014 | In revised form: 14 June 2014 | Accepted: 22 June 2014 |

Published: 5 September 2014

Abstract: This article attempts to explore and analyse the evidence for cohabiting the human

security concept into the national security frameworks of ASEAN countries. Using the Philippines

and Malaysia as case studies, the article determines the extent to which public officials and

policymakers have redefined and reenvisioned national security by incorporating non-traditional,

people-centered elements of human security. The word 'cohabitation' refers to national govern-

ments' efforts to amalgamate statist and humanist dimensions of security when articulating and

implementing their national security rhetoric and agenda. It argues that human security

naturally complements state security, and vice versa. As such, human security and state security

co-exist in a constructive manner that enhances the overall level of national security. In other

words, they are mutually constitutive rather than mutually corrosive. Both cases underscore a

two-pronged assumption. First, the meaning and provision of national security can neither be

eloquently articulated nor completely substantiated without considerations for 'below the state'

actors and issues. And second, the eminent status vis-à-vis power of the state in providing

national security can neither be trivialized nor undermined.

Keywords: Cohabitative Security; Human Security; Malaysia; National Security; Philippines

1. Introduction

Twenty years after the official debut of human

security in academic and policymaking circles in 1994,

the concept continues to be a source of important

debates directed at the progressive re-imagination of

national security. In Southeast Asia, however, the

concept has had very limited influence in the govern-

ments' formulation and implementation of their

respective national security rhetoric and agenda [1–3].

This is largely due to the conflicting views on what

should be considered as a threat between the state

and various non-state actors within these societies. At

the heart of this conflict between statist and humanist

advocates of national security is the shared belief

among Southeast Asian leaders in the ASEAN Way [1–3].

under a Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).

For the region's top officials, the ASEAN Way is deemed

the most appropriate style of diplomacy as it underlines

the value of traditional notions of sovereignty and non-

interference in conducting interstate relations [4].

While the Western method of diplomacy is driven by

binding agreements through the adoption of legalistic

procedures and formalistic solutions, the ASEAN

approach operates through non-binding, invisible

ground rules of informality, inclusivity and consensus

[4]. Different labels have been used by various

observers to describe the ASEAN Way such as

'organizational minimalism', 'soft regionalism', 'soft

dialogue', and 'thin institutionalism' ([4] pp. 14–27).

Such a preference for 'sports shirt diplomacy' over

'business shirt diplomacy' has naturally limited the

practical application of human security in rethinking

national security in the Southeast Asia ([4] pp. 14–27).

Against this backdrop, this article attempts to

explore the evidence for the 'cohabitation' of human

security concept within the national security frame-

work of ASEAN countries in the twenty-first century. It

specifically examines the Philippines and Malaysia's

experiences with cohabiting state-centric and people-

centered dimensions of national security. The word

cohabitation in this context refers to the national

government's attempt at amalgamating statist and

humanist elements of security when articulating and

executing its national security policies. The goal is to

determine the extent to which policymakers have

defined national security based on the cohabitation

between state-centric and people-centered dimen-

sions of national security. Cohabitative security, there-

fore, refers to the approach being employed by the

Philippine and Malaysian governments in cohabiting

human security into their national security frame-

works.

The article argues that human security naturally

complements state security, and vice versa. As such,

human security and state security co-exist in a

constructive manner that enhances the overall level of

national security. On the one hand, state security does

not automatically negate human security nor compete

with individuals and communities; on the other, human

security does not necessarily threaten state security nor

compete against state actors and agencies. The reason

for this is that human security and state security are

mutually constitutive rather than mutually corrosive.

This is particularly relevant in the context of the

increasing, albeit gradual, recognition among ASEAN

governments that human security is an essential di-

mension and necessary precondition for national

stability and security. Such a scenario implies that the

divisive dichotomy between these two security dimen-

sions is hardly insurmountable. Ironically, it is the

insecurity felt by individuals and states, rather than

security that is transforming ASEAN's traditional

normative terrain into a region cognisant of the value

of cohabiting humanist and statist components of

national security.

Moreover, by examining governments' efforts

toward cohabitative security, the article argues that

the inherent bias against states can be mitigated,

enabling mutual trust to develop between the arti-

ficially divided state and non-state agents of national

security. It highlights the areas where states, even if

only to some extent, have practically contributed to

the advancement of the human security agenda. This

is not to defend or legitimize the shortcomings of

states with respect to human security, but rather, to

reopen the channel through which productive dia-

logues between governments and citizens can take

place. The notion of cohabitative security does not

provide a panacea to long-standing conceptual prob-

lems of national security. Nevertheless, it offers an

alternative tool for reassessing governments' successes

and failures in terms of incorporating individuals and

societies in their respective national security discourses.

In advancing these arguments, the article examines

the Philippines and Malaysia's experiences with

cohabitative security and attempts to answer the

following questions. First, who or what is the primary

referent object in the Philippines and Malaysia's

twenty-first century national rhetoric and agenda?

Second, what are the main issues that threaten these

primary security referent objects? And third, how do

the Philippine and Malaysian governments, both past

and present, address these threats? Have they been

successful? Why or why not?

The article is divided into four sections. Section two

examines the current composition of the Philippines'

national security framework by identifying its main

components and analyzing the most critical issues

that threaten its primary security referent object—

development space. It argues that against the

backdrop of structural poverty and institutionalized

inequality generated by a deeply-entrenched oligarchic

system, the main referent object of Philippine national

security is its diminishing development space.

Development space refers specifically to the capacity of

the Philippine government to independently and

effectively pursue its economic development goals and

objectives against these constraints. It analyses the

limits to the Philippines' development-based national

security framework, which in turn, undermine the

effectiveness of the country's cohabitative national

security, namely: (i) limits to democratization; and (ii)

limits to Human Security Act (HSA).

Section three examines the present condition of

Malaysia's national security framework by identifying

its main components and analyzing the most critical

issues that threaten its primary security referent

object—diversity space. It argues that against the

backdrop of a Bumiputra-centric political economy,

developed and controlled by the UMNO-driven Barisan

Nasional, the main referent object of Malaysian na-

tional security is its shrinking diversity space. Diversity

space specifically refers to the capacity of all ethnic

groups in Malaysia to participate freely in the country's

political and economic affairs against these constraints.

It analyses the limits to Malaysia's diversity-based

national security framework, which in turn, undermine

the effectiveness of the country's cohabitative national

security, namely: (i) limits to ideational security

apparatuses; and (ii) limits to material security

apparatuses. The Philippines and Malaysia's primary

security referent objects—development space and

diversity space—represent the non-traditional, people-

centred dimension of security as opposed to its

traditional, state-centric dimension.

Finally, section four summarizes the main argu-

ments presented based on the analysis of two

empirical case studies. It concludes that despite the

limitations of the Philippine and Malaysian govern-

ments in fully cohabiting the concept of human se-

curity into their respective national security frame-

works, nonetheless, both countries have illustrated a

concrete way of giving entitlement to non-traditional,

people-centered elements of security as legitimate

referent objects of national security. Both cases

underscore a two-pronged hypothesis: (i) that the

meaning and provision of national security can neither

be eloquently articulated nor completely substantiated

without considerations for 'below the state' actors and

issues; and (ii)that the eminent status of the state in

terms of power in providing national security can

neither be trivialized nor undermined. Therefore,

rather than downplaying a state-centric concept while

highlighting a people-centred model, cohabitative se-

curity amalgamates statist and humanist views of

national security. This is one way of resolving the

'entitled state/untitled human' dilemma in which the

state is typically depicted as an antagonistic force

impeding the pursuit of human security.

2. Cohabiting Human Security into the

Philippine's National Security Framework

2.1. The Philippines' 'Cohabitative' National Security

The Philippines' 2011‒2016 National Security Policy

(hereafter, NSP) is a statement of principles designed

for the strategic pursuit of the country's national in-

terest defined in terms sovereignty and territorial integ-

rity on the one hand, and people's well-being and insti-

tutions on the other [5]. Its primary objectives focus on

balancing between 'guns and butter, ' through more

efficient allocation of the country's limited resources

and effective prioritization of internal and external

defense. It lays down a fairly comprehensive agenda

which incorporates nonmilitary issues and threats

encroaching upon the boundaries of the state. In the

words of President Benigno Aquino III: 'our quest must

not only focus on ensuring the stability of the State and

the security of our nation...our ultimate goal must be

the safety and well-being of our people' ([5] p. 1).

This holistic approach to national security under-

scores the need to rethink traditional security which

made paramount the military protection of the state

from external threats while disregarding issues

generating human insecurities. It is part and parcel of

the larger security sector transformation (SST) which

represents a paradigm shift in security governance by

acknowledging the blurring between internal and

external threats [6]. The main thrust of the NSP is

anchored in Aquino III's 'social contract' with the

Filipinos, emphasizing commitments to transfor-

mational leadership through empowerment of the

people and opportunities to enable the people to

escape from the shackles of poverty ([5] p. 6). Aside

from its customary role in fortifying the country's

juridical borders, the NSP also aims to cultivate an

environment conducive to human development, that

is, a development-based NSP agenda. Thus, it brings

together under one cohesive policy agenda a wide

range of security issues, and balances these with its

national peace and development perspectives.

The country's desire to serving as a committed and

trustworthy member of the international community is,

to a large extent, driven by the emergence of non-

traditional security threats transcending national

borders such as organized transnational crimes, ter-

rorism and weapons of mass destruction, pandemics

and infectious diseases, environmental degradation,

and climate change to name a few [5]. In relation to

this, the country also acknowledges the significant

impact of globalization on its internal affairs. The NSP

document, therefore, promotes the objective of forging

strong political alliances with developed countries to

further solidify its political presence in the international

arena, and secure its economic and defense require-

ments [5]. The government believes that through

diplomatic engagements, nations will cooperate rather

than compete with each other [5].

In response to this changing security environment,

the government has developed a national security

model comprised of seven core elements that amplify

national interests, including: socio-political stability,

territorial integrity, economic solidarity, ecological

balance, cultural cohesiveness, moral-spiritual con-

sensus, and peace and harmony ([5] p. 3). These

elements also take into consideration certain psycho-

social aspects of national security including the people's

customs and beliefs, as well as social characters and

norms influencing perception of government-initiated

policies and programmes ([5] p. 3). Hence, the

government is very optimistic about the potential of

its twenty-first century NSP agenda for achieving not

only national peace and security, but, more impor-

tantly, development and prosperity. Working under a

widely popular campaign slogan of Daang Matuwid

(the high road), Aquino III's NSP strongly emphasizes

the country's diminishing development space, artic-

ulating the issue as a national security threat that

must be effectively secured ([5] p. 31):

"If the government is able to make good on the

promise of taking the high road, the 'Ang Daang

Matuwid', then it must be sure that the people

are afforded every opportunity to pursue their

individual dreams of a better quality of life—all

under the consideration of national security

where the welfare and well-being of the people

are of primordial consideration."

From the government's perspective, addressing the

country's long-standing problems of exacerbated

poverty, widening inequality, and other socio-political

maladies engendered by limited development space

demands complementary policies such as robust

public-private partnerships (PPP) on the one hand,

and breaking patronage politics influencing decision

making in government's programs and projects on the

other [5].

Despite its development-based NSP agenda, the

government still recognizes the importance of main-

taining a credible external defense posture since

globalization has not led to complete obsolescence of

war as an alternative tool for settling disputes when

diplomacy fails. Impaired by its present economic

status, however, the country is struggling to assert

and defend its position in international society. The

government usually finds itself on the losing end

when settling disputes with advanced countries, given

its small player status in the global arena, both

politically and economically. The debate between

'guns and butter' has to be settled in favour of 'butter'

given the country's scarce resources. After all, as

Aquino III has neatly put it, 'For Filipinos to feel this

renewed sense of transformational leadership, they

must also see and feel that the Government is for

them, with them and serving them' ([5] p. 31).

2.2. Limits to the Philippines' Development-based

National Security

Clearly, the Philippine government recognizes economic

underdevelopment as a critical threat to national

security. The important question that needs to be

examined, however, is whether it is genuinely con-

cerned about addressing the country's economic plight

or is only paying lip service to the electorally-popular

idea of people-centered national security. Despite the

government's grand pronouncements about pursing

equitable economic development to enhance national

security, however, its security blueprint faces two

limitations that put enormous challenge to such

intention: (i) limits to democratization; and (ii) limits to

human security act. The following subsections discuss

these limits, which help explain the country's con-

tinuously shrinking diversity space, and subsequent

failure to fully embed the notion of human security

(defined in terms of economic security) into its national

security framework.

2.2.1. Limits to Democratization

Based on historical analysis of politico-economic

developments in the Philippines, the decision of the

American colonial regime to transplant its own brand

of representative democracy over an economic ar-

rangement ruled by landed oligarchs enabled the

latter to seize authoritative control over what should

have been 'democratic' policymaking procedures and

institutions [7]. Oligarchs in this context are 'actors

who command and control massive concentrations of

material resources that can be deployed to defend or

enhance their personal wealth and exclusive social

position' ([8] p. 6). Accordingly, an oligarch's ultimate

goal 'is to secure, maintain, and retain his or her

position of extreme wealth and power against all

manner of threats' ([8] p. 6). In Aristotle's formu-

lation, democracy is defined as the rule by the poor

majority, whereas oligarchy is the rule of the wealthy

few [8]. However, democracy and oligarchy 'can

coexist indefinitely as long as the unpropertied lower

classes do not use their expanded political partic-

ipation to encroach upon the material power and

prerogatives of the wealthiest' ([8] p. 11). In other

words, the two systems are compatible for as long as

the two realms of power do not clash. So while

oligarchy 'rests on the concentration of material

power', democracy 'rests on the dispersion of non-

material power' ([8] p. 11).

In the case of the Philippines, US officials left aside

policies that could have transformed its political

system into a more level playing field. The country's

domestic political space was insulated from revisionist

agendas espoused by various social factions springing

from a broad base of political capital [7]. In stark

contrast to the Philippine experience, the Japanese

consciously shut down the elite's access to political

power when they took over Korea, creating a very

different political climate for the latter state [9]. The

Philippines' government's capacity for independent

action, therefore, is effectively curtailed by oligarchic

groups attempting to amass public power to preserve

vested interests [10‒12]. Further, the 'redemoc-

ratization' process that took place immediately after

the collapse of Ferdinand Marcos' dictatorship only

resulted in the reinstallation of the pre-Marcos political

order. This led to the re-emergence of elite ascen-

dancy over domestic economy—the sine qua non for

Philippine economic underdevelopment ([7] p. 49).

Despite the introduction of various democratic insti-

tutional reforms, oligarchic forces are still able to

manipulate and saturate the bureaucracy, impairing

Philippine polity.

The question therefore is, why and how does

oligarchic power overcome state power? Throughout

Philippine history, several influential families owning

huge corporations and vast lands have ruled over the

bureaucracy, exploiting the country's public goods and

resources that continue to fuel institutionalized cor-

ruption. Several infamous terms such as 'anarchy of

families', 'booty capitalism', and 'cacique democracy'

([7] p. 50) have been used to describe the country's

pitiful politico-economic construct. The conspicuous

incapacity of the government to 'immunize' itself from

oligarch manipulation has been at the crux of

economic underdevelopment [13‒15]. This unique

political climate enables the 'top 5.5 % landowning

clans to own 44% of arable land and as few as 100

families control all electoral positions on a national

level' ([16] p. 13). It is a side-effect of the strategy

employed by the US regime to consolidate power

throughout the archipelago that the landed elite were

allowed to further expand their economic power by

means political appointments [7].

When put together, Filipinos' distinctive concepts of

family and land give rise to the so-called 'patron-client

relationships' which can be used to explain Philippine

political economy [17‒18]. The patronage system

which emphasizes the Filipino culture of 'giving for

gratitude' and 'labour for loyalty' explains the existence

of an omnipotent elite dominating the country's econ-

omy cum politics [19]. In this scenario, both the

peasants' and the labourers' interests feed into the

landlords' preferences through material and/or personal

transactions via colloquial networks [20].

Hence, when the US colonial regime decided to

establish political offices for electoral contest, the elite

clans consolidated their power in order to give birth to

national oligarchy instead of a national government

(Anderson 1998). With this newfound power, the

ruling elite are now in the position to thwart policies

that favour both enemies and competitors. This

system of politicking gave rise to what the Filipinos

call, trapos or 'dirty' traditional politicians [21‒23].

These trapos are responsible for the presence of

'reverse accountability' in Philippine politics by holding

individual voters accountable for electing their re-

spective patrons to power in exchange for favours

provided in the past or those promised once said

politician elected ([7] p. 55). The provision of favours,

however, does not always translate to actual votes. In

such cases, intimidation and aggression are often

employed by political players owning private armies to

ensure the delivery of paid votes [24]. The alternate

use of benefits and violence for preserving political

power and control essentially transforms traditional

political aristocracy into some type of warlords [25].

In can be inferred, therefore, that the voters' support

for their patrons is largely a function of the latter's

'own interests, rewards for loyalty, and the fear of

vengeance' ([26] p. 260).

The nature of Philippine political-economy is referred

to as a neo-patrimonial system [10]. A patrimonial

state that allows oligarch relations and interests to

dominate bureaucratic systems creates a hunting

ground for the unrestricted accumulation of personal

wealth [27]. Since the rent-seekers emerging from

this bureaucratic capitalist system are able to control

formal state structures from the outside, the term

becomes 'neo-patrimonial' or 'booty capitalism' ([10]

pp. 18‒21).

The overwhelming oligarchic influence has signif-

icantly contributed to the deterioration of economic

development in the Philippines since gaining inde-

pendence from the United States in 1946 [28]. Even

the implementations of disastrous economic policies

advanced by top government officials were eventually

manipulated to protect the interests of Filipino

oligarchs. Philippine underdevelopment, therefore, is

not just a matter of constantly choosing the wrong

policies, but rather the result of conscious efforts by

rent-seekers to maintain them for the continuous

exploitation of state mechanisms and resources.

A perfect illustration of a 'wrong' policy selection

was the espousal of import substitution indus-

trialization (ISI) as the country's primary trade

strategy after its official independence from the US

[29‒30]. In contrast to East Asian countries that

launched an export-oriented strategy leading to annual

per capita GDP growth of 6%, the Philippines chose to

implement ISI and became the worst performing

economy in the Eastern half [31]. While the promotion

of ISI may indeed have been an honest mistake on

the part of Filipino technocrats, the oligarchs' indif-

ference toward the correction of this mistake never-

theless underlined the unintended benefits it created

with respect to the their interests. Despite the

exacerbated balance of trade and payments problems

created by ISI, this policy was maintained not for its

effectiveness in resolving the crisis but for its role in

opening a wider space for 'oligarch predation' ([7] p.

57). This confounding relationship between local

oligarchs and the Philippine government is often re-

ferred to as 'rent capitalism' wherein rents are created

by the latter to provide the former with a synthetic

advantage by imposing restrictions on the free flow of

foreign goods and services into the market [32].

U.S. Governor-general William Howard Ta ft's 'policy

of attraction'—originally designed to entice the

landlord class into collaboration with the Americans

rather than pursuing revolutionary struggles—trans-

formed the economic elite of the Spanish-colonial era

into a political-economic elite that continues to dom-

inate domestic politics today ([33] p. 142). And since

representative institutions had already emerged prior

to the development of a strong republic, patronage-

infested political parties had single-handedly squashed

government reforms that threatened to curb their

power. In the Philippine context, political parties are

'convenient vehicles of patronage that can be set up,

merged with others, split, reconstituted, regurgitated,

resurrected, renamed, repackaged, recycled, refur-

bished, buffed up or flushed down the toilet anytime'

([34] pp. 4‒5). This resulted to further marginalization

of the masses who were unable to challenge the

deeply-entrenched national oligarchy.

The palpable failure of American colonial regime to

renovate the foundations of domestic political power

vis-à-vis the imposition of its own brand of repre-

sentative democracy on top of an unjust economic

edifice, created an environment conducive to oligarch

predation by exploiting state institutions and manip-

ulating economic policy formulation [7]. The Philippine

government has continued to operate within this

context from one administration to another since the

country's formal independence. Therefore, implanting

a new constitutional framework that replicated a pre-

Martial Law system within a relatively unchanged

economic arrangement would be futile and counter-

intuitive to the prospect of change. In short, neither

regime change nor democratization helped in miti-

gating the oligarch's influence over state affairs,

particularly in decisions involving the national eco-

nomy. As a consequence, a strongly developed

Philippine republic is yet to emerge [7].

2.2.2. Limits to Human Security Act

The post-1986 People Power Revolution paved the

way for rethinking national security as the security of

the people. The perceived divide between people and

state is artificial as they both comprise the nation-

state [35]. Although the government is gradually

progressing toward the integration of human security

in its formulation of national security, the environment

within which such policy amendments are being

configured remains largely unstable and multifaceted.

Advancements made toward a humanist view of secu-

rity strategy are in danger of being undermined by

institutional mechanisms with inadequate capacity to

effectively combat contemporary security problems.

And while Filipino policymakers acknowledge the

severity of nontraditional threats trespassing on the

country's supposedly sovereign boundaries, the term

human security is still nowhere to be found in its

official NSP document. This implies that the normative

foundations of human security are not consistently

implanted when designing a definitive NSP agenda

despite references being made regarding the pro-

tection of grassroots civil societies [35].

A good example supporting this argument is the

passage of the Human Security Act of the Philippines

or the Republic Act No. 9372 in February 2007. This

Act defined human security as an 'act to secure the

state and our people from terrorism' defined as

'sowing and creating conditions of widespread and

extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in

order to coerce the government to give in to an un-

lawful demand' [36]. In short, the country's HSA is

both too narrow and too broad at the same time. On

the one hand, it frames human security within the

narrow context of terrorism which contradicts the

government's holistic approach to national security, as

well as the UNDP's comprehensive interpretation of

human security [37]. On the other hand, it precludes

the fundamental aspects of a terrorist act in favour of

broad and vague expressions such as 'widespread and

extraordinary fear and panic among the populace' or

'unlawful demand' which also run in contrast to the

definition proposed by the UN High Level Panel on

Threats, Challenges and Change [38].

While the official discourse of HSA highlights its

importance for giving the government's all-out war

against terror legal teeth by complementing AFP's

strategic operations, however, law enforcement

agencies seem to be uncomfortable with its imple-

mentation [39]. Such contradiction underlies reser-

vations toward the Act, given its use of misleading

semantics. Moreover, human rights groups have

strongly opposed the legislation of the HSA arguing

that it constitutes the building blocks of martial law.

The rights that are at risk of being violated include

freedom of expression, association, speech, move-

ment, and due process, among others [40]. The ac-

countability of the Anti-Terrorism Council for human

rights violations while carrying out its mandate of

fighting against terrorism is not specifically addressed

in the said Act, blurring the line between Judiciary and

Executive roles [40].

Supporters of the anti-terrorism legislation, on the

other hand, point to Section 2 of the Act which

highlights the safeguard mechanisms for protecting

human rights by upholding basic rights and funda-

mental liberties as enshrined in the Constitution. They

argue that the HSA is crucial for strengthening the

country's democratic ideals since 'unlike the secrecy

surrounding the pre-HSA extrajudicial killings, the new

law makes the prosecution of terrorists a transparent

matter that proceeds under the supervision of the

Philippine judiciary' ([41] pp. 215‒216). Despite such

contextualization, the inefficiencies of the country's

criminal justice system have not been properly

addressed [42]. Understandably, several international

organizations, most notably the International Feder-

ation for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, are

sceptical about the effectiveness of these safeguards,

given the government's bad record for policy imple-

mentation, and they argue that what the Philippines

really needs is not a new and dangerously broad

counterterrorism law, but better efforts to make its

current justice system work [43].

This age-old dichotomy between the ineffectiveness

of the law and the inefficiency of the system is

underlined in the report published by the National

Council of Churches in the Philippines, which asked,

'How can the State—which stands criticized for

tolerating, if not authorizing the gross and systematic

violations of human rights—guarantee that, in imple-

menting the HSA, the people's civil and political rights

are not trampled upon' ([40] pp. 168‒169)? As such,

various segments of civil society including the aca-

demia and NGOs share the view that RA9372 is in

violation of the Philippine Constitution by purporting

information designed to mislead the people [40].

Overall, these two limits have significantly under-

mined the Philippine government's efforts at

effectively cohabiting human security (defined in

terms of economic security) into its national security

framework. At the root of this insecurity is a deeply-

entrenched patronage system controlled by powerful

Filipino oligarchy. The pervasiveness of this politico-

economic arrangement has resulted to structural pov-

erty and institutionalized inequality that undermines the

Philippines' supposedly people-centred national security

model. Neoliberal economic policies intended to im-

prove development have been cunningly exploited by

oligarchic forces to their uncontested advantage. By

systematically obstructing social-equalizing measures

that curtail oligarchic wealth, 'national' prosperity is

permanently entrapped within the elite strata of the

society. The omnipresence of neo-patrimonial culture

in the Philippines reinforces a 'bipolar' society wherein

a few families enjoy the abundance of wealth at the

expense of the majority. Despite the Philippines' co-

habitative national security framework underlining

equitable and inclusive economic development, the

limits to democratization vis-à-vis its Human Security

Act, have significantly undermined this end goal.

3. Cohabiting Human Security into Malaysia's

National Security Framework

3.1. Malaysia's 'Cohabitave' National Security

Malaysia's national security rhetoric and agenda are a

reflection of the government's struggle to transform a

former British colonial territory into one cohesive and

united nation. Accordingly, Malaysia adopts a fairly

comprehensive approach in defining national security

by weaving together its military, political, economic,

social, cultural, and psychological components [44].

Several material and ideational factors influence

Malaysia's conception of national security, including:

geography and history; multi-ethnic identity and

religious plurality; an aspiration for national unity and

integration; and a dream of becoming a developed

country and a model Islamic nation [45‒46].

As such, Malaysia's national security encompasses

both internal and external dimensions. On the one

hand, the domestic security being derived from internal

peace, law, and order is crucial to the fulfilment of

basic needs and demands of its pluralistic society [45‒

46]. The presence of internal stability and harmony

underpin Malaysia's pursuit of national development

and progress. Hence, the passage and enactment of

legislation considered draconian in some liberal dem-

ocratic states is deemed necessary by the Malaysian

government in order to control its ethnically-diverse

population [46‒48]. On the other hand, external

security focuses on wide-ranging transnational threats

engendered by regional and global events including

terrorism, maritime piracy, drug cartels, illegal migrant

workers, and human trafficking, to name a few [49‒

51]. Malaysia's pursuit of national security, therefore,

implies the notion of strategic survival, both inside

and outside its sovereign boundaries.

The conception of Malaysian national security has

been largely inspired by the Emergency period

between the years 1948 and 1960 [45,52‒55]. This

period saw the Malayan forces, backed by their British

colonizers, fight against the Malayan National Lib-

eration Army (MNLA), a group of Communist insur-

gents who claimed to be promoting a new democratic

socialist Malaya [45,46,52]. In response, the coalition

launched its 'hearts and minds' campaign to weaken

the social appeal of Communist propaganda and earn

the loyalty of those sympathetic to them [45,48,

52,56‒57]. This proved to be an effective component

of the coalition's anti-Communist strategy as it led to

the establishment of a new constitution singed be-

tween the United Malays National Organization

(UMNO) and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA)

in 1957 [45‒46]. It is worth noting that both signa-

tories are member parties of the ruling BN coalition.

The new constitution recognizes the legality of

special preferences and privileged positions being

provided to the Malays [45,48,52‒58]. Islam has been

formally elected as the state religion, while Malay was

made as the country's official language. Moreover, the

new constitution has granted a fixed quota of posts in

the civil service to Malays in addition to their guar-

anteed traditional land rights. In exchange for

accepting these terms under the Constitution, the

Chinese have been offered extended rights of

citizenship [45‒46,59]. As stated in Article 153 of the

Malaysian Constitution:

It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-

Pertuan Agong (King of Malaysia) to safeguard

the special position of the Malays and natives of

any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the

legitimate interests of other communities in

accordance with the provisions of this Article [60].

Thus, the Constitution provides strong legal basis for

the provision of exclusive rights and privileges to

Malays, locally known as the Bumiputras (literally, sons

of the soil) which are not extended to other ethnicities

thriving in Malaysia, particularly the Chinese and

Indian-Malaysians. Notwithstanding Malays' continued

political supremacy and a considerably enhanced eco-

nomic status, Article 153 remains entrenched in the

Constitution. The application of the Malaysian Consti-

tution legitimizes Malay interests even at the expense

of all other Malaysian ethnic groups.

The Emergency period served as a sine qua non for

legitimizing a national security framework that is both

operationally despotic and ideologically centered on

addressing the root causes of threats. Malaysia's

national security is essentially based on material and

ideational constructs designed to secure its ruling

dynastic coalition—the Barisan Nasional (BN)—rather

than the diversity space necessary for accommodating

the political and economic needs of its multiethnic

population. In fact, the BN defines itself as a con-

federation of political parties that subscribe to the

objectives of the coalition, as opposed to the objec-

tives of Malaysia's national interest [61].

Combining ideological constructs with a coercive

apparatus has been the traditional approach to

developing Malaysia's national security rhetoric and

agenda since the period of Emergency [46,52,54‒55,

62]. Such an approach is designed to secure the BN

by suppressing the growth of unorthodox ideas and

concepts, while justifying the supremacy of values

being cultivated by the ruling coalition. Together, coer-

cive and ideological instruments have played a crucial

role in Malaysia's national security, which made para-

mount the implicit protection of the Malay-dominated

coalition at the expense of its diversity space.

3.2. Limits to Malaysia's Diversity-based National

Security

In doing so, the UMNO-led BN coalition has vigilantly

upheld a paradoxical security framework propelled by

its 'hearts and minds' slogan exercised through

coercive and repressive legislation [48, 62‒63]. Such a

paradox presents two critical limits to Malaysia's

diversity space that is pivotal to the country's cohab-

itative national security, namely: (i) limits to ideo-

logical security apparatuses, and (ii) limits to material

security apparatus. The interplay between these

factors substantially undermines the country's capacity

for independently formulating and executing political

and economic policies vital to its national security. The

succeeding subsections discuss these limits which help

explain the country's continuously shrinking diversity

space, and therefore, its failure at fully embedding the

notion of human security (defined in terms of ethnic

security) within its national security framework.

3.2.1. Limits to the Ideological Security Apparatus

A central task of the BN's security ideology is the

regulation and control of alternative channels for

discussing nonconforming opinions [48,62]. A variety

of ideological constructs have been put in place to

legitimize the suppression of local political opponents

and critics, thereby protecting the prevailing Malay-

dominated status quo. As Downs ([64] p. 96) argues,

these nonmaterial forces represent 'a verbal image of

the good society and of the chief means of con-

structing such a society.' In other words, the govern-

ment systematically regulates the employment of

ideologies to promote and preserve the security of the

BN coalition, pursued under the pretext of safe-

guarding the constitutionality of specific Malay rights

and privileges that do not apply other ethnic groups.

The coalition's security ideologies serve a two-level

function: first, restricting the space available for

alternative ideas that question the BN; and second,

legitimizing the passage and enactment of coercive

instruments vis-à-vis the coalition that exercises them

[48,63]. In doing so, they help in securing the pre-

eminent status of the coalition against threats coming

from various oppositional groups. The fluidity of ideas,

however, implies that the coalition's security ideo-

logies are neither permanent nor fixed but are con-

tingent on specific political and social contexts of the

time (48, 62]. Hence, there is no overarching idea

that dominates Malaysia's security rhetoric. Never-

theless, there is an underlying goal that binds these

security ideologies together, that is, winning the

hearts and minds of societal actors that threaten

Malaysian national security defined in terms of BN

security.

These coalition-enhancing ideational forces create a

'cloak for shabby motives and appearances' by

legitimizing and giving meaning to its conduct ([65] p.

314). They act as political tools for securing the

coalition's hegemony, rather than being mere reflec-

tions of the country's national aspirations. The

uncertainty and complexity of Malaysian politics in the

twenty-first century transforms these ideological

constructs into electoral 'chips' necessary for con-

tinued survival of the coalition [48,53,62‒63,66‒68].

Accordingly, the ideational components underpinning

Malaysia's national security framework are naturally

bent to quash counter-narratives, thereby further

shrinking the country's diversity space.

Islam plays a pivotal role in the hearts and minds

campaign of the coalition. As a Muslim-dominated

federal constitutional monarchy, Malaysia's national

security becomes a function of its state-configured

Islamic ideology [48,63,69‒71]. Its goal is to cement

the country's role as a worthy leader of the Muslim

world by projecting an image of moderation and

tolerance [48,62‒63]. Islam must be the people's way

of life and the coalition's brand of leadership. It is the

very 'visible hand' that runs and controls Malaysia's

internal and external affairs, and dictates what the

objectives of national security will be. Crafting the

country's national security rhetoric and agenda based

on the underlying goal of securing the coalition

becomes the paramount concern of the ruling BN

political elites, particularly for those comprising the

United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) party

[48,62‒63].

On the one hand, Mahathir's security ideology

represents a two-faced Malaysian national security

framework by endorsing a non-violent and non-forcible

Islamic rhetoric at the international scene, while

encouraging coercive and aggressive policies in imple-

menting these teachings at the domestic sphere on the

other [48,59,63]. Such an approach to national security

effectively aids in the legitimization of the coalition's

domestic security machinery which means the

perpetuation of the Malay-dominated BN coalition, and

therefore, the diminution of Malaysia's diversity space.

At the international level, the Mahathir regime has

portrayed Malaysia as the 'model Islamic state' of the

post-9/11 world [48,51,55,62‒63]. The former PM

argued that its government had been successful in

fighting terrorism domestically by adding ideological

'sweeteners' to its coercive policies [51,55,62]. Such a

claim is typically made in the context of the Emer-

gency, where the defeat of communism is largely

viewed as a result of its hearts and minds ideology,

emphasizing a moderate and tolerant Islam [45‒

46,52,54,62].

At the domestic level, however, the opposite is

observed. Mahathir's state-sponsored Islam has been

propagated with the help of strong coercive

legislation, particularly the Internal Security Act (ISA)

of 1960 and its replacement, the Security Offences

Special Measures Act (SOSMA) of 2012 [48,54,56,

59,63,72]. This highlights underlying contradictions

within Mahathir's ideational panorama—conquering

the hearts and minds of a fearful population through

the forced imposition of a coalition-made Islam. The

implicit goal of eliminating counter-narratives to BN's

vision of Malaysian nation-building has been pursued

under the banner of counterterrorism (48, 63).

On the other hand, Badawi's security doctrine

which he called Islam Hadhari (Civilizational Islam)

still reflects Mahathir's aim at securing the coalition,

rather than the diversity of its multi-ethnic population

[48,63,73‒74]. Substance-wise, Islam Hadhari has no

significant difference from Mahathir's Asian values

[75]. In terms of form, however, Abdullah's ideology

takes Mahathir's notion of the 'model Islamic state' to

a higher level, by developing a comprehensive doc-

trine embracing Muslim and non-Muslim audiences

alike, both at home and abroad [48,63]. In other

words, Malaysia's signature Islam has been trans-

formed into an exportable commodity that reinforces

the legitimacy of the BN coalition beyond the

country's borders [48,73].

The terms that have been used to develop Islam

Hadhari were fairly 'universal', and as such can be

applied to different contexts. Badawi's ideology

represents a shift toward understanding the contem-

porary era within the purview of Islam [73]. It is the

form, rather than substance that made Islam Hadhari

an appealing ideological construct [48,63]. By utilizing

charismatic Islamic terminology, Badawi has suc-

ceeded in reigniting the coalition's unpopular security

ideology (Liow 2005). Badawi's main thrust is to

recalibrate Islam as a progressive religion that values

individual and communal development [76]. For

instance, the fourth, fifth, and sixth principles high-

light Islam Hadhari's economic undertones which

reflect Badawi's promotion of Islam as a religion for

development [48,51,63,57,77‒78]. By restoring the

sense of moderation toward the practice of Islam,

Badawi had hoped that non-Muslim Malaysians would

feel embraced by the regime [69].

At the international level, Badawi attempted to

export Islam Hadhari to both Muslim and non-Muslim

countries. The idea is to cement Malaysia's role as a

model nation and leader of the Muslim world by

manufacturing it as a development model based on a

state-authorized version of Islam [48,63]. However, at

the domestic level, the operationalization of Badawi's

doctrines is questionable at best. It is not clear

whether Islam Hadhari represents genuine efforts

toward a progressive interpretation of Islamic

thinking, or merely a strategy for securing Malaysian

votes by not openly marginalizing its non-Malay and

non-Muslim population [69,76].

The coalition has utilized its ideological machinery

in justifying the coercive measures undertaken during

a series of crackdowns against 'deviant' sects such as

the Tarikat Samaniah Ibrahim Bonjol in 2004, and

Terengganu or Sky Kingdom in 2005 [79‒81]. In

2004, seventy members of the Muslim sect Tarikat

Samaniah Ibrahim Bonjol were arrested in Selangor

by Islamic religious authorities [79‒81]. The govern-

ment claimed that the sect treated the Qur'an as a

historical text, which resulted to its 'casual' attitude

toward prayer and marriage. In the aftermath of

these arrests, Malaysian chief executive, Khir Toyo

announced his plan to vanquish some sixty divergent

sects operating in Selangor [79‒81]. In 2005, another

religious sect in Terengganu known as Sky Kingdom

was also shut down by the Department of Islamic

Development [79]. The government claimed that the

movement was propagating documents that coun-

tered Islamic teachings. Its leader, Ayah Pin was

presented to the public as threat to national security

by espousing alternative views on religion and lifestyle

that differ from those provided by the government. In

doing so, Aya Pin was not only jeopardizing the

country's official religion but also destabilizing the

political status quo [80].

The government has portrayed these religious

entities as threats to Malaysia's national security by

espousing alternative views of Islam, and adopting a

lifestyle different from the ones endorsed by the BN

coalition. However, Sky Kingdom's 'threats' to national

security were ideational rather than material in

nature. These events offer a glimpse to the condition

of diversity space in Malaysia despite its multiethnic,

multireligious society. These events highlight Ma-

laysia's unsecured diversity space amid a multiethnic,

multireligious society, which in turn, undermines the

country's national security.

Islam Hadhari

has also provided the government an

effective ideological apparatus for stifling its political

rival, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). Badawi

has likened PAS' brand of Islam to a trap that must be

exposed to prevent Malay Muslims from being

ensnared [48,74]. Under

Islam Hadhari

, the PAS is

faced with a lose-lose situation: either to comply with

a BN-sponsored Islam and operate within this limited

context or reject this model and become an enemy of

the state [48,55,63,76]. Either way, the ideological

terrain within which PAS can manoeuvre is significantly

diminished. Needless to say, Islam Hadhari has further

enhanced the government's monopolistic control over

the organization and facilitation of Islam. Divergent

sects operating beyond the provisions and boundaries

set by the coalition are more easily detected and

trounced. Hence,

Islam Hadhari

becomes an extension

of the implicit campaign against the expansion of the

diversity space critical for Malaysia's pluralistic society.

3.2.2. Limits to the Material Security Apparatus

The government's ideational security constructs are

complemented by a material security apparatus. This

involves are coercive laws designed to secure the

status-quo by removing all material and/or ideational

challenges to its legitimacy [45‒46,48,53‒55,58‒

59,63,67,82]. A primary example is the recently re-

pealed Internal Security Act (ISA) passed by PM Abdul

Rahman in 1960 [83]. The ISA served as a preventive

detention law which enabled the arrests of individuals

without trial and criminal charges under limited,

legally defined circumstances for sixty days. Moreover,

the Act also allowed the extension of this detention

period for up to two years upon the discretion of the

Home Minister with minimal judicial review [83]. As

stated in Section 73 of the Act, 'any police officer may

arrest and detain without warrant any person who has

acted or is about to act or is likely to act in any

manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any

part thereof' [83].

The ISA is further complemented by the Sedition

Act, revised in 1971 by Malaysia's second PM Tun

Abdul Razak which made any questioning of Malayan

paramountcy an act of treason. The Act prohibits

virtually all activities with 'seditious tendency', resulting

to disaffection and hostility toward the government or

communal ill will [84]. Despite initial controversies, the

coalition has skilfully justified the presence of ISA and

Sedition Act as necessary legislation for ensuring

Malaysia's national security [45‒46,52].Such laws are

deemed to be particularly relevant in the context of the

post-9/11 world order, where they serve as effective

counterterrorism measures akin to the Patriot Act of

the US, and the Anti-Terrorism Act of the UK.

In recent years, however, opposition to the ISA has

grown considerably. Critics have argued that the Act

was passed to stifle what should have been legitimate

political oppositions under a well-functioning dem-

ocratic society and as such had been compared to

internal pre-emptive strike, given its preventive nature

[53‒54]. For example, during the 1987 Operasi Lalang

(Weeding Operation), 106 people were arrested

without proper charges under the ISA. Most of the

detainees were members of the opposition party and

various social activist groups. The coalition issued a

White Paper explaining the arrests, stating that

various groups which had played up sensitive issues

and thus created racial tension in the country had

exploited the government's liberal and tolerant

attitude [54‒55,85‒86].

One of the most significant outcomes of this

struggle was the introduction of section 8B of the ISA

which blocked judicial review of ISA detentions

including those brought as habeas corpus petitions

[87‒88]. In 2001, this section of the ISA was used to

detain members of the People's Justice Party (PJP)

dubbed as the 'Reformasi or KeADILan 10' [87‒88].

The detainees, led by Anwar Ibrahim's wife, Wan

Azizah Ismail pressed vocally for his release, Ibrahim

had been convicted of misuse of power and sodomy in

trials, which according to Human Rights Watch, were

marred by coerced confessions of key witnesses [87‒

88]. Prior to his imprisonment, Anwar was leading

rallies across Malaysia in support of his newly-

formed reformasi movement, preaching to vast crowds

in favour of far-reaching social, political, and economic

reforms [45,54‒55,86]. In response, Mahathir's side

claimed that the arrested activists were planning

violent protests to overthrow the government and were

attempting to procure dangerous weapons and

explosives [87‒88]. Yet despite the serious nature of

these charges, the government failed to produce any

credible evidence to support its claim.

These abuses drove oppositionist groups, human

rights activists, and other civil society advocates to

mobilize large-scale protests against the ISA, por-

trayed as unnecessary draconian law that does not

bode well for Malaysia's vision of progressing toward

'developed nation' status [87‒88]. The popularity of

these movements, along with the resurgence of a

stronger opposition after the 2008 General Election,

played a crucial role in PM Najib's decision to repeal

the Act. In 2012, the Security Offences (Special

Measures) Act or SOSMA has officially replaced the

ISA [89]. The new Act is envisioned 'to provide for

special measures relating to security offences for the

purpose of maintaining public order and security and

for connected matters.'

In contrast to ISA, the new law requires the filing

of charges based on credible evidence against

detainees after twenty-eight days [89]. Thus, the

burden to produce reliable proof within a specified

time frame is shifted to the government's law en-

forcement and intelligence agencies responsible for

combating terrorist activities. However, SOSMA is also

being criticized from both sides. On the one hand,

anti-terrorist groups argue that the requirement to

bring charges within twenty-eight days under SOSMA

weakens Malaysia's capacity to pre-emptively contain

terrorist threats [90]. On the other, human rights

groups criticise SOSMA for allowing police to authorise

communication intercepts and permitting prosecutors

to present evidence without disclosing sources.

Moreover, acquitted suspects in the midst of an appeal

may still be detained in prison or tethered to a

monitoring device until the appeal is formally settled

[90].

Overall, these two limits have significantly under-

mined the Malaysian government's efforts to effec-

tively cohabit human security (defined in terms of

ethnic security) into its national security framework.

The BN's ideational and material security apparatuses

ensure the preservation of a Malay-dominated status

quo. In the process, the BN has become synonymous

with the Malaysian nation-state. The noble objective

of protecting Malays' interests is equated to the venal

objective of preserving the BN's political supremacy,

pursued under the banner of securing Malaysia's

shrinking diversity space. In pursuing its Bumiputra-

oriented social vision, the government has utilized

trade liberalization, along with complementary neo-

liberal economic policies, but often at the expense

other Malaysian ethnic communities. In other words,

they have been fervently pursued to reinforce and

safeguard a Malay-imagined society. As long as the

constitutional frameworks that legitimize a Bumiputra-

centric Malaysian nation-state are sustained, de-

ethnicizing the country's politico-economic and socio-

cultural arrangements remains highly implausible.

Thus, Malaysia's national security is, for better or

worse, developed around Malay ethnic identity.

4. Conclusion

This article has critically examined the Philippines and

Malaysia's experiences with cohabiting the human

security concept into their respective national security

frameworks. It argued that while on the one hand, the

Philippines' primary security referent object is its

shrinking development space amid a deeply-entrenched

patronage system controlled by a powerful Filipino

oligarchy; on the other, Malaysia's main security

referent object is its contracting diversity space amid a

Bumiputra-centric political economy, developed and

controlled by the perpetually ruling BN coalition. Both

the Philippines and Malaysia's primary security referent

objects—development space and diversity space—

represent the non-traditional, people-centred dimension

of national security rather than its traditional, state-

centric dimension.

A variety of limits have severely undermined the

two countries' efforts at cohabiting human security

into their respective national security frameworks. In

the case of the Philippines, the limits of its democ-

ratization and its Human Security Acts have produced

an enormous challenge to securing its development

space, defined in terms of economic security. Whereas

in the case of Malaysia, the limits to ideological and

material security apparatus have presented significant

constraints in securing its diversity space, defined in

terms of ethnic security.

These limits have contributed to the country's

lacklustre experience with cohabitative security.

Nevertheless, both cases have illustrated a concrete

way of giving entitlement to non-traditional, people-

centered elements of security as legitimate referent

objects of a national security framework. The

Philippine and Malaysian experiences underscores a

two-pronged assumption: first, the meaning and

provision of national security can neither be eloquently

articulated nor completely substantiated without con-

sideration of 'below the state' actors and issues; and

second, the eminent status of the state vis-à-vis power

in providing national security can neither be trivialized

nor undermined.

Hence, instead of downplaying a state-centric

concept while highlighting a people-centred model,

cohabitative security amalgamates statist and hu-

manist views of national security. This is one approach

to resolving the 'entitled state versus untitled human'

dilemma in which the state is ordinarily depicted as an

antagonistic force obstructing the quest for human

security.

This invisible yet concrete divide between states

and individuals vis-à-vis communities, creates a dist-

orted view that the state does not acknowledge the

multidimensionality of national security in the modern-

day era. Thus, despite claims being made by state

actors with regard to their revised national security

rhetoric and agenda, non-state actors continue to

view national security as a purely militaristic object

bereft of human sensibility. On the one hand, the

state claims to have created a novel national security

vision protecting human security. But on the other

hand, citizens and communities equate national

security to the anachronistic pursuit of sovereignty

and territorial boundaries.

The employment of cohabitative security means

that state security and human security become

mutually constitutive and reinforce dimensions of

national security. A shift in the government's per-

ception of state security can have a corresponding

impact on individuals and communities' collective

perception of human security, and vice versa. There-

fore, this allows the state to have a more positive and

nurturing image in the security narrative. It veers

away from the innate tendency to portray the state as

a completely distinct security domain that must be

temporarily de-emphasized and/or unaccounted for

when advancing human security objectives.

In doing so, it 'unvilifies' the role of the state in

pursuing a human security rhetoric and agenda.

Instead of being diametrically opposed, the cohab-

itative security approach shows that state security

complements human security, and vice versa. To some

extent, the invisible divide between the 'high politics'

of the states and the 'low politics' of the people and

communities is bridged, enabling state actors to

realize the multidimensionality of national security in

the twenty-first century. A more collective under-

standing of national security shared by governments

and citizens is therefore realized.

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