Journal of Human Security | 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1 | Pages 59‒75

DOI: 10.12924/johs2014.10010059

ISSN: 1835-3800

Research Article

The Fragility of the Liberal Peace Export to South Sudan:

Formal Education Access as a Basis of a Liberal Peace Project

Ngambouk V. Pemunta

* and Eno-Akpa R. Nkongho

Department of Cultural Sciences, Centre for Concurrences in Colonial and Postcolonial studies, Linnaeus

University, 35195 Växjö, Sweden

Department of Public Policy, Central European University, Nador utca 9, 1051 Budapest, Hungary;

E-Mail: enoakpar@yahoo.com

* Corresponding Author: E-Mail: [email protected]om; Tel.: +46 729469558; Fax: +46 47083217

Submitted: 28 March 2014 | In revised form: 20 June 2014 | Accepted: 1 July 2014 |

Published: 20 November 2014

Abstract: This study examines the disjuncture between the policy transposition of the Liberal

Peace Project (LPP) in South Sudan from the country's local context. It underlines how deep

rooted historical exclusion from social welfare services reinforces political exclusion and exac-

erbates poor civic engagement among different ethnicities in the country causing a constant re-

lapse to violence. The study combines a qualitative review of data from Afrobarometer, the

National Democratic Institute, international NGOs, and South Sudan's government reports with in-

depth interviews and participants' observation. The research finds that restricted access to formal

education alongside the conservative and orthodox approaches to peacebuilding, which broadly

focus on centralised urban political institutions and exclude diverse local needs and preferences,

limit citizenship participation to elections and preclude an equitable social order in South Sudan,

establishing a continuum of fragile authoritarian peace, institutional peace and constitutional

peace. In an emancipatory approach, the study proposes a framework that prioritizes an ex-

tended access to primary and post-primary vocational education as a more credible establishment

for sustainable civil peace in the country. The LPP by the international community needs to be

tailored to enhance the political will of the South Sudan government to extend free primary

education access, incentivize primary education with school feeding programmes and to invig-

orate vocational training curricula. These will yield civil peace dividends, which avert South Sudan's

structural source of relapse into violence with sustainable disincentives. Apart from women's em-

powerment through education and in all spheres of life, the government needs to ensure sustain-

ability by guaranteeing a sustainable future for the present and for returning refugees by reducing

the effects of climate change so as to cope with the increasing pressure on natural resources.

Keywords: conflict; formal education; liberal peace; peacebuilding; post-conflict settlement;

South Sudan

under a Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).

1. Introduction

The world's newest nation-the Republic of South Sudan

(RSS), is once again in prolonged international media

coverage, and has been since 15 December 2013.

Characteristic of her history, the potracted conflict over

socio-political and economic marginalisation by the

Republic of Sudan of then South Sudan has resurfaced

in the RSS, ending not just the euphoria of its inde-

pendence from the Republic of Sudan on July 9, 2011

but also, crippling hopes for a politically inclusive state

with an equitable social order. In retrospect, one is

obliged to wonder whether the 2005 Comprehensive

Peace Agreement (CPA), ending decades of civil conflict

against the people of South Sudan and subsequent

peacebuilding attempts in the post independence fed-

eral, presidential democratic RSS, are apt enough to

yield sustainable civil peace. Peacebuilding or the Lib-

eral Peace Project connotes the processes aimed at

reviving the state's capacity to identify, support and

strengthen her socio-political and economic structures

in view of averting structural factors that cause or

nurture a relapse into violent conflict [1,2]. However,

the LPP in RSS has evidently failed and the country is

back to war, echoing a political power tussle with ethnic

undertones opposing the majority Dinka of president

Silva Kiir and his ex-deputy Riek Machar from the Nuer

ethnicity. Empirical evidence suggests a concentration

of civil wars in countries with little education like the

RSS. Conversely, in a country with a higher proportion

of its youth in school, the risk of conflict is significantly

reduced [3‒6].

2. Aim and Method

This paper examines the mismatch between peace-

building and locally felt needs of conflict resulting

from the LPP in the RSS. The crux of the argument is

that the lack of formal education opportunities con-

stitutes a structural source of relapse to conflict in South

Sudan. Consequently, the consolidation of democratic

institutions, modelled on the conservative and orthodox

approaches to peacebuilding that characterize the cur-

rent practices of the LPP in the country does not target

the root causes of violence and its recurrence. The

paper concludes that the prioritization and provisioning

of formal education opportunities is justifiable and

would serve to attain the LPP objectives of civil peace.

The paper underlines the fact that though the

emancipatory approach of the LPP—the bedrock of

international peacebuilding initiatives is highly con-

sidered of theoretical and impracticable value [7], it

could operationalize the approach through institutions

of primary and post-primary vocational education. The

study highlights the need to accomplish meaningful

social, political and economic inclusion of a population

easily induced to violence in South Sudan's peace-

building process through increased access to primary

education and post primary vocational training as an

urgent policy implementation option that would disin-

centivize recourse to violence and rather induce du-

rable or civil peace.

The study made use of bottom-up (felt needs) and a

top-down methods that underpin the emancipatory

approach of the LPP. It involves substantial, qualitative,

desk research that reviewed reports, surveys and doc-

uments of peacebuilding stakeholders (civil society

organizations, bilateral aid donors, multilateral peace

agencies) and the national government of South

Sudan. Individual in-depth interviews and participant

observation were also used to abduce information from

stakeholders.

3. Background: Agitation and Resistance from

Social and Political Exclusion

Sudan's history is characterized by a specter of unending

civil wars that has significantly affected Southern Sudan,

accounting for the relapse to conflict in the new country.

Sudan, from which South Sudan gained independence

suffered two major civil strifes between 1955 and 1972

and from 1982 to present. This 'long history of political

vulnerability and exclusion' ([8] p. 1) disproportionately

affected Southern Sudan. During the Anglo-Egyptian

condominium (1899–1934) the British imperial gov-

ernment, and later the ruling northern elites, used

education as a tool for the perpetuation of socio-

economic and political marginalization of both majority

rural communities and Southern Sudan in particular. The

British 'Northern policy' encouraged and perpetuated the

socio-economic exclusion and marginalization of Sudan

at the detriment of the then Southern Sudan. They

modernized the economy and infrastructure of the north

while Christian missionaries provided the much needed

'moral guidance' rather than economic development in

the Southern Sudan. This 'Northern policy' did set the

stage for political vulnerability and exclusion of Southern

Sudanese.

In a glimpse of recognition of the problems of

Southern Sudan in the time of the Anglo-Egyptian Con-

dominium, Britain passed the 'Closed District Order' of

1922. This Order was an anti-Islamic policy meant to

curtail northern dominance and slave raids in Southern

Sudan. Within this policy framework, vernacular lan-

guages in Southern Sudan became the language of

instruction while English was the official language.

Arabic was banned from school and government

offices in Southern Sudan. Although these policies

were 'based on indigenous cultural values and Christian

cultural norms', and instilled a sense of identity in

Southern Sudanese, the real aim was to link Sudan

with East Africa for easy administration as part of

British indirect rule system.

However, these policies woefully failed to spike

socio-economic development, but instead widened the

existing inequities between the North and South. In

the 1940s, South Sudan's educational infrastructure

was comprised of a limited number of missionary

schools, few elementary government schools, one

teacher training centre, one commercial school and

one senior secondary school ([8] p. 2, [9] p. 3,[10] p.

86). Worse still, the British represented the indigenous

population as lazy and unenthusiastic in improving

their socio-economic wellbeing ([11] p. 32). However,

at the end of World War II the unity of Sudan took

greater impetus due to pressure from Egypt and the

northern elites, causing the British to address the

need to accelerate economic and educational devel-

opment so as to put Northern and Southern Sudan at

par ([10] p. 88).

This explains why in 1957, the Government of

Sudan took over mission schools in South Sudan, and

in 1962 expelled Christian missionaries from the South

for allegedly inciting South Sudanese against the

Arabization and subsequent Islamization of schools.

This suggests that one key factor for anti-government

agitation is the adoption of policies that exclude South

Sudanese from formal education opportunities, a sit-

uation that also reflects a quality of education far

removed from the context of South Sudan. This

exclusion of South Sudanese from formal educational

opportunities further explains how lack of formal edu-

cation affected the ability of South Sudanese to

participate in government beneficially, or to yield the

positive externalities of an educated environment

which would generally have led to improved welfare of

the population in question [4].

The exclusion of Southern Sudanese from formal

education severely curtailed their access to schools-

legitimized their cultural suppression and social

exclusion. Furthermore, it lowered the retention rates

of Southern Sudanese at school, implying their ex-

clusion from skilled professions, from public service

institutions and political participation [4,12]. This

lends credence to the fact that in civil strife endemic

areas—(the lack of) education generates significant

negative externalities. Independence was eventually

brokered with the northern elites, who became the

new colonial power. Thereafter, Sudan slipped into a

17 year civil war that ended in 1972.

In the post-independence era—the northern Su-

danese elites and the Sudan central government effec-

tively used the educational apartheid paradigm as a

political tool, underpinned by Arabo-Islamism as the

cornerstone of national unity. The educational system

was tacitly used to undermine the religious and

cultural diversity of Sudan since recognition of diver-

sity was perceived as incompatible with the racio-

cultural equity of the southern part to the northern

part of the country. Islamization was used as a tool of

civilization with the aim of erasing "the pagan patri-

mony". This explains why Arabic came to replace

English as the language of instruction leading to

intense widening of the gap between north and south.

Additionally, apart from rewriting the history, Northern

Sudanese historians simultaneously erased—"the

Sudanese indigenous history" while the culture and

tradition of the latter "have never been imparted in

education policy since the dawn of independence in

1956" ([8] p. 2). During the four years preceding

Sudan's independence, less than 8% of children in the

South were in school, while the share of girls was

almost zero, compared to 20% of girls in the North

who were enrolled in all primary streams ([8] pp. 3‒

4). After self-autonomy in 1982, the Sudan central

government failed to provide adequate resources and

social and economic services further incapacitating

Southern Sudanese. With an estimated population of

20 million, primary school enrolment was 40% in

Northern Sudan, while it was less than 12% in

Southern Sudan. The 'Southern policy' of forging a

Sudanese identity for both the northen and southern

parts, which was based on the Arab-Islamic paradigm

with the educational system as the basis, led to

frustration and Southern Sudanese took up arms in

1982 agitating for independence with the hope of

establishing a more equitable and inclusive society.

At independence in 2011, the RSS was extremely

fragile due to decades of conflict with the Republic of

Sudan, partly over oil wealth. Prior to this date, since

independence in 1956 Sudan has been engulfed in

two major civil wars (1955‒72, and 1982‒present).

The country's new leadership is comprised largely of

former rebels who had often fought each other. Most

notably, Silva Kiir and his ex-deputy Riek Macher and

others split away from the main rebel group—the

Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)

in 1991. The independence of the RSS has since been

only a lull as the rift between the protagonists Macher

and Kiir gets deeper and—intractable, inducing socio-

political and economic exclusion along ethnic lines,

commemorating—the political fractures that triggered

the RSS's fight for independence. The civil strife in the

RSS now exacerbates deep-seated ethnic animosities

and tensions. At independence the RSS was dismally

bereft of basic social services and infrastructure: the

outcome of decades of civil strife and decades of

neglect despite its huge oil and mineral wealth.

Corruption and nepotism orchestrated on regional and

ethnic lines remained rampant and widespread [13].

Although precluded from the United Nation's

Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Devel-

opment Index (HDI) due to data constraints, the 2006

Household Health Survey [14] and the 2009 National

Household Baseline Survey [15] provide some insights

into human development trends in the country. In

2009, infant mortality rates were 102 out of 1'000 live

births, a slight improvement from 131 in 2008 and

lower than rates for Burundi (106). In the same period,

under-five mortality rates dropped from 381 to 135

per 1'000 live births. These improvements were the

result of a slight increment in public expenditure for

primary health care and the temporary return of peace

following the signing of the CPA. This notwithstanding,

South Sudan topped the global maternal mortality chart

in 2009 with 2'054 per 100'000 live births, and the

lowest life expectancy in East Africa at 42 years.

Education and formal literacy levels remained

extremely low: only 27% of children over 15 years old

were considered literate (compared to 77% in Rwanda,

73% in Uganda, 70% in Tanzania, 62% in Kenya and

47% in Burundi). While the net school enrolment rate

was merely 48%, only 37% of the total population

above six years old had attended school. These trends

are attributable to long periods of internecine strife

during which there was an acute shortfall in the

delivery of public goods and services as well as to the

accompanying insecurity. Low literacy is further com-

pounded by poor access rates, inadequate educational

infrastructure and the potential increase in demand

for schooling with the return of refugees. The net

intake rate to the first year of primary school stood at

14.6% [16]. The pupil/teacher ratio was 52:1, the

pupil classroom ratio was 129 children per classroom

and the net enrolment rate stood at 48% ([17] p. 17).

South Sudan ranks at the bottom of all human devel-

opment indicators: 8 out of 10 persons live on less

than $1.63 a day; a net primary education enrolment

of 46%; a qualified teacher to pupil ratio of 1:117 and

a literacy rate of 27% [18]. Estimates of the female

illiteracy rate exceed 80%, it has the the world's high-

est maternal mortality rate, less than 100 kilometres of

paved road, suffers from the risk of increased violence

and harm to civilian population and permanent

humanitarian suffering [18] given the ongoing political

turmoil in the country. About 38'000 children under 18

years of age have reportedly been conscripted into

the army, forced labour or slavery over the past 15

years in Southern Sudan. These abductions have

eventuated into a demographic imbalance: a drastic

decrease in the number of males in the 20‒39 age

bracket when compared to females ([20] p. 1). The

country is bedecked by lack of basic services, poor

harvests, rising food prices, lack of jobs, lack of gover-

nance skills in public officials, corruption/nepotism in

public institutions and political domination [18]. The

country's economy is unhealthily dependent on oil that

guarantees 98% of GDP from which 35% of revenue is

spent on state security and security sector reforms and

7% and 4% respectively are devoted to health and

education [21]. Education in South Sudan is facing

several challenges: poor coordination of education ser-

vices, lack of national goals, policies and standards for

education, increased insecurity, frequent displacement

and the constant recruitment of male children by

warring factions as 'child soldiers'.

Compounding this situation and further threatening

the ephemeral peace with human security implications

is climate change that tends to exacerbate the

degradation of the environment—and lead to resource

use conflicts and pose both direct and indirect threats

to food security. In South Sudan, the duration and

timing of rain is becoming erratic. Rainy seasons are

increasingly not only delayed but also shortening at a

rate of 30‒40% [22]. As a result, the incidence of

drought and flooding are not only inevitable but are

increasingly becoming more frequent- temperatures are

rising in winter, often with disastrous consequences for

the population and the environment. These changing

rainfall patterns spell doom for rural farmers in par-

ticular and the population at large. Further conse-

quences of climate change include, but are not limited

to: cholera outbreaks, poor crop yields and late har-

vests, as well as severe crop losses. The drying of

permanent rivers is resulting in seasonal rivers, re-

duction of water tables in boreholes, delays and

shortening of rainy seasons. Simultaneously, some

regions are generally receiving less rain, and the

amount of water is dropping, leading to drought. The

reduction in rainfall has turned millions of hectares of

already marginal semi-desert grazing land into desert.

People have been forced to migrate and added

significant stress on the livelihoods of pastoral societies

as pastoralists and agriculturalists are at each other's

throats for access to scare natural resources. On the

other hand, some areas have more intense rain events,

driven by climate change, which contributes to more

run-off and floods, threatening food security and

settlements, and leading to diseases such as cholera.

The Sahara Desert is also expanding southwards [23].

The change in rainfall patterns has led to food in-

security, vast migrations and loss of animals, especially

cattle. Crops and livestock are threatened in a country

where about 80% of the population are cattle rearers

leading a pastoralist lifestyle. There is also intense

competition for natural resources which are increasingly

scarce due to global warming, leading to rapid defor-

estation, land grabbing, and tenure insecurity due to

resettlement of people returning to South Sudan after

the war, as well as high rates of land privatization. The

vicious cycle of multiple stresses "endemic poverty,

ecosystem degradation, complex disasters and conflicts,

and limited access to capital markets, infrastructure and

technology have all weakened people's ability to adapt

to changes in climate" ([23] p. 3, [24] p. 2).

Deforestation is accelerating due to wood being

collected for fuel, charcoal production, livestock, agri-

culture, bricks, and the collection of construction mat-

erials. There is also intense competition for portable

water between people and livestock, as well as

habitat degradation for livestock and wild life due to

vegetation degradation and desertification (most ac-

centuated in the North and Southeast). It has been

estimated that in the Upper Nile province, each

removed tree results in the deforestation of 0.03 ha

and that the annual use of charcoal of one family

accounts for 2.6 ha of deforestation in that area.

Furthermore, huge quantities of charcoal (60'000

bags) representing 2'700 hectares of deforested land

are also exported from the Renk County in Upper Nile

to Sudan ([22] p. 4, [37,38]). A study conducted by

the International Food Policy Research Institute

(IFPRI) found that temperature anomalies significantly

affect the risk of conflict. Through the prism of the

local weather in South and North Sudan between

1997 and 2009, the organization maintains that, in

the future, the risk of violent conflict caused by global

warming is expected to magnify in a range of 21‒30%

under a median scenario, while factoring in uncer-

tainties in both the climate projection and the esti-

mate of the response of violence to temperature

variations. The report further underlines that extreme

temperature shocks are found to strongly affect the

livelihood of violence as well, but the predictive power

is hindered by substantial uncertainty [22,23,25].

The latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classi-

fication (IPC) analysis conducted in April and May 2014

in South Sudan indicates that a conjuncture between

conflicts, displacement, destroyed markets and dis-

rupted livelihoods has led to the deterioration of food

security since the outbreak of conflict in 2013. Most

people in the three most conflict-affected states of

Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei scored 4 on the IPC scale

of 5 showing an alarming increase in the number of

people in the IPC Food Security phase. Some 1.3 million

of the country's 11.5 million people are experiencing

emergency levels of food insecurity. Additionally, 2.4

million people are in the IPC Food Crisis Phase (scoring

3 in the IPC scale of 5) suggesting that they need ur-

gent assistance [25]. These figures indicate that more

than one-third of South Sudanese are facing excep-

tional levels of food insecurity. These figures further

suggest a conjuncture between widespread hunger,

and growing malnutrition, diseases, livelihood losses

and the likelihood of death.

The situation is likely to deteriorate as the food

security crisis spreads to previously unaffected areas,

except farmers are able to plant their fields, fishing

communities can freely have access to rivers and

water ways and herders can migrate between grazing

areas. Food secure communities are feeling the strain

of conflict as they experience the burden of hosting

internally displaced people. This has engendered con-

flict over scarce resources, leading to accentuated

environmental degradation [22,23,25]. The lack of

access roads makes intervention by humanitarian

agencies challenging, as most displaced communities

are increasingly being cut off by a vicious cycle be-

tween rains that bring seasonal flooding and inad-

equate access due to conflict. A cholera outbreak has

already claimed the lives of 23 people in Juba and

forced more than 670 others to seek treatment [26].

The surging and thriving of conflict is correlated

with low HDI and human insecurity. In the RSS,

human development and conflict are intertwined:

"War and violence pervade all aspects of human de-

velopment". The impacts may be direct, when people

are killed or injured. "Or they may be more indirect

conditions of insecurity blocking farmers from working

their lands, women from leaving their homes for fear

of sexual violence or children from attending schools.

The absence of peace constrains the choices and

freedoms of people. Peace provides the foundation for

life, human development and human freedom". Hu-

man security argues for placing the human individual

at the centre of security attention, rather than fo-

cusing on the rise or fall of state power alone. The

risks stemming from multiple threats to the human

individual and communities in (South) Sudan emerge

as a key means to understand and assess security

challenges, from violent conflict to lack of adequate

drinking water or access to medicines to manage

diseases. "Human security effectively serves as a

mirror of human development: while human devel-

opment as an approach focuses on expanding the real

freedoms people enjoy, human security ensures the

protection of these freedoms" ([27] pp. 18‒19).

The human security framework is underpinned by

the premise that high human development can help

generate conditions for peacebuilding by removing ec-

onomic and social injustice as a cause for grievance.

And that peace in turn can help to establish human

security conditions that further human development

achievements. This reinforcing relationship can break

the vicious cycle of low human development and con-

flict experienced in Sudan ([27] p. 19). Low levels of

human development and high levels of poverty and

inequality act as drivers of conflict. The lack of schools,

or poor education quality with thwarted aspirations and

high levels of unemployment can create a volatile pool

of disaffected young people. The population of South

Sudan is estimated at 8.3 million: 4 million (48.2%)

are female and 4.3 million (51.8%) are male. It

should be noted that a large proportion of the

population of South Sudan are still refugees living in

other countries. The population was estimated to have

expanded to 10.6 million by July 2012 due to the

return of refugees [17]. There is a high concentration

of the population in rural areas. The annual population

growth rate stands at 2.9% with a low population

density of 13 people per square kilometre. About 72%

of the population is aged below 30 years, 51% under

18 and 30% under 10. Most South Sudanese people

are young, live in rural areas. The CPA (2005) led to

the temporal restoration of peace, saw improved devel-

opment indicators, the return of refugees and improve-

ment in fertility and life expectancy. This has resulted in

increased demand for extra resources to deliver public

goods, especially in rural areas ([17] p. 8) where pov-

erty is a lived reality.

More than half of the population (50.6%) is con-

sidered poor. However, poverty is gendered with wo-

men accounting for 51.6% of those living below the

national poverty line of US$ 28 per month. Poverty is

accentuated in rural areas, home to nine out of ten

poor people. This is significant, given that 24.4% of

urban against 55.4% of rural people are considered

poor. The incidence of poverty varies across states:

three quarters of poor people are found in Northern

Bahr El Ghazal whereas, only a quarter of the pop-

ulation in Upper Nile are considered poor ([17] p. 9).

The geography of poverty in South Sudan is further

characterized by high inequalities in incomes. A huge

gap exists in consumption between the poor and non-

poor. The Gini-coefficient (a benchmark used to esti-

mate inequality) puts the gap between the poor and

non-poor at 45.5. Collaborating this estimate, the 2009

National Household Baseline Survey showed that con-

sumption per person in the uppermost 90th deciles of

the population was more than ten times that in the

lowermost 10 deciles and that on average, poor people

consumed about 25% more than the non-poor [14].

The existence of significant development disparities

between urban and rural areas is driving rural-urban

migration and growth in the informal sector, thereby

depriving rural areas of productive human capital and

exacerbating poverty.

Nevertheless, poverty and low human development

achievements are only partial causes for insecurity.

Colonial roots and environmental degradation also

play important roles. "Sudan might be the first site of

violence induced by climate change. The movement of

the Sahara desert up to 150 kilometres in some loca-

tions poses a severe threat to migratory groups or set-

tled population over dwindling resources. This makes

environmental stewardship a central concern for peace

and human development in Sudan" ([28] p. 20).

4. Education and the Liberal Peace Project

Critical scholars on peacebuilding are unanimous on the

need for social justice and welfare inclusion to the LPP

as a desirable emancipatory approach to achieve sus-

tainable civil peace in post war environments [7,29‒

32]. This is because post Cold War civil conflicts are

multidimensional. They involve tensions around ethnic

identity; the failure of legitimate or effective gover-

nance, discriminatory politics, widespread poverty and

socio-economic inequality between constituent groups,

war economies thriving on the capture and trade of

natural resources, and easy access to small arms and

light weapons [33‒34]. As a consequence, international

efforts at peace operations have evolved through four

generations: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, International

Statebuilding into peacebuilding or the Liberal Peace

Project—LPP [2]. Boutros Boutros-Ghali first injected

the concept of Peacebuilding into the UN system in his

An Agenda for Peace, raising the need for multilateral

international interventions in conflict zones to effect

policy reforms beyond monitoring disarmaments and

supervising the implementation of peace agreements

among warring parties to effecting post conflict peace-

building [1].

From the 1990s, multilateral peacebuilding actors

assumed that "there is a universally agreed normative

and cultural basis for the liberal peace (model) and

that interventionary practices derived from this will be

properly supported by all actors" ([35] p. 111). Sub-

sequently, the international policy of post war recon-

struction emphasized peace agreements, security

sector reform, democratic institutions (constitution

building, elections, rule of law institutions, human rights

enforcement) and the installation of a free market eco-

nomic model in post-settlement Peacebuilding [29,36].

Unfortunately, about half of the peacebuilding missions

failed in about five years of liberal peace import, as

evidenced by recurring violence, and thereby raising

policy failure alarms [37], raising a need for the LPP to

move from institutional peace (non-violent status quo

based on anchoring post conflict states within the

normative and legal contexts of transnational organ-

izations such as the UN) and constitutional peace

(resting upon the establishment of democratic values

and free trade in post conflict states) to civil peace—

founded on averting violence through immediate post

conflict state response to citizen advocacy and mobi-

lization for welfare needs and social justice [7].

Both its critics and its advocates argue that the LPP

paradigm is in crisis because it prioritizes building

government capacity (which tends to guarantee insti-

tutional and constitutional peace) that will deliver in-

clusive, social welfare services only in the future over

more immediate capacity building and instant service

delivery, which brings about civil peace [29,7,31].

Critics argue that liberal peace missions have largely

recreated states (Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, An-

gola, Haiti and even Cambodia) with weak domestic

governance incapable of providing public goods, poor

human rights records and contexts where the rule of

law is increasingly questionable and where conditions

for a relapse to armed violence are imminent [37,38].

Furthermore, lack of local ownership [36], close ended

time frames of liberal peace mission that conceive of

peace as a state of affairs rather than a dynamic

process and lack of strategic coordination and

inadequate attention to domestic tensions and local

context [29,38] have been invoked as the causes of the

failure of liberal peace. As a concept, the LPP connotes

provision of post conflict humanitarian assistance;

political, social and economic reconstruction; security

sector reform and international statebuilding. The LPP

is underpinned by conservative, orthodox and eman-

cipatory theories [7] but the practical methods for

achieving sustainable peace or civil peace in post con-

flict countries like South Sudan are elusive [32,7].

Robin Luckham, a key advocate of the eman-

cipatory approach to peacebuilding emphasises the

relationship between democracy, security and devel-

opment as being the cornerstone of global liberal go-

vernance. This relationship, he concedes, should

inform the conceptualization of the fourth generation

peace interventions [39]. Peacebuilding is thus—recon-

structed through local and international agencies, and

their mediation, to include institutions, rights, needs,

culture, and custom, from security, political, economic,

social welfare and justice perspectives dictated by the

internal context of the mission [40]. Commenting on

the fragility of the LPP in South Sudan, Ylonen suggests

that there is need for the peacebuilding interventions

and the South Sudan government to create political,

economic and social institutions that are inclusive as

well as providing wider access to welfare services [32].

However, the practical ways to deliver civil peace

through this emancipatory approach that guarantee

structures preventing a relapse into conflict have re-

mained elusive.

Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

to the independence (2011) and post independence of

South Sudan, peacebuilding has suffered from a lack

of local reception, a lack of durable participatory gov-

ernance and a frequent relapse into violent conflict

[32]. It has been argued that liberal peacebuilding in

South Sudan is detached from the internal reality

thereby making stability in the country fragile. Among

other things, "tangible development progress, such as

(the) building of hospitals or gaining access to quality

education, are seen as vital in establishing peace and

this realization needs to be at the heart of peace-

building activities" ([30] p. 10). Formal education—the

medium for imparting pedagogic instruction, shared

values, good attitudes and behaviours [41] is a social

welfare institution, a social justice mechanism for

marginalized and disgruntled groups and a locally

acclaimed means for the emancipatory approach to

the LPP to take root in South Sudan. In countries

emerging from wars, a well designed formal education

curriculum may ease psychological violence (fear and

hatred) in the minds of survivors and victors, helping

them to desist from being fanatics, or supporting ide-

ology that legitimize structural violence [42]. It must be

stated that formal education, in post war settlement

countries may make or mar new publics either creating

"a conglomerate of self indulgent consumers; … (and)

angry soulless, directionless, hopeless masses; indif-

ferent,confused citizens; or a public imbued with con-

fidence, sense of purpose…respect for tolerance" ([43]

p. 18). This implies that the formal education curricula

in peace reconstruction countries like the RSS should

foster positive social relations, multiethnic integration

and community development.

A 1994 review of 98 country cases from 1960‒1990

by George Psacharopoulos shows that the private and

social rates of returns from primary education stand at

20.8% and 18.2% in annual returns of the initial

costs, reducing poverty and enhancing social welfare

for countries that opt for policies that broaden access

to primary education [44,5]. Moreover, post-primary

vocational training would yield social benefits (positive

externalities such as modernization and social inte-

gration of ethnic groups, improved civic engagement

and improved standards of living). In addition to

private gains (e.g. jobs, greater income, savings,

investments), formal vocational training will help

broaden the government revenue source and sustain

peace dividends and the production of public goods

for example, security and basic services [6]. We argue

that the private returns of education can be easily

measured in quantitative terms (e.g. in income or

contribution of taxes coming from such income to

government revenue or jobs that are created because

of training and its impact on Gross Domestic Product

(GDP). The Social returns of education are qualitative

in nature and it is common knowledge that for the

more literate populations of the North, it might be less

easy to persuade citizens into patronage politics. Such

citizens tend more than their uneducated counterparts

to issues of the day and engage into political and civil

life in more beneficial ways.

However, in its 2011‒2013 Development Plan, the

Government of South Sudan recognised that its

education and health indicators are among the lowest

in the world, reflecting the impact of protracted

conflict and limited provision of social services. Only

27% of the adult population is literate and less than

half of all primary-school-age-children are in school

(51% of boys and 37% of girls). The ratio of qualified

teachers to pupils stands at 1:117 [21]. Yet education

is positioned with regard to the budget as the last

priority area in its development plan. Apart from the

fact that external actors (foreign states and

intergovernmental organizations) commit inadequate

funding and capacity building to revive access to

quality education in South Sudan—6% of 2009 donor

funding [45,18], the new deal for measuring progress

in peacebuilding excludes education and only focuses

on legitimate politics, security, legal justice, economic

foundation and state revenues [45].

In fact, most international agencies "opted not to

support and facilitate the creation of a conducive

education policy environment but rather to work in

isolation under the pretext of supporting the com-

munity-based education initiatives". Also, the donor

communities have different perspectives to education

in conflict areas. While the United States Agency for

International Development (USAID) supports edu-

cation in South Sudan, other donors have taken a

rather lukewarm attitude towards education ([8] p.

11). This is the case even when education has been

recognised during civil war as a right for all children

as well as a need that must be met. Such arguments,

following Sommers have 'tugged more at the heart-

strings than the purse strings of major international

donors' ([46] p. 24). While USAID supports basic

education, other international donors have been pre-

occupied with the misplaced view that education is a

luxury in emergencies and not a humanitarian need

([47] p. 9). As a collective responsibility, the provision

of education to all children despite prevailing con-

ditions calls for coordinated efforts and actions even

in situations where international NGOs do not nor-

mally work [46]. One of the ingredients that ignited

war in Sudan was the marginalisation and exclusion of

South Sudanese through the education system, which

eventually led to deep differences in political and

economic relations between North and South Sudan.

Education promotes global human values and citizen-

ship both in peace time and during civil wars.

The dark cloud of interethnic conflicts in the history

of South Sudan suggests that peace accords that do

not target the structural causes of conflict—exclusion

from social welfare services, domination or suppression

of ethnic identities, centre-periphery inequality, conflict

over resources, intra-elite competition and brute causes

or criminality risk- relapsing into a cycle of violence

[48]. If accountable institutions are not in place to

guarantee immediate socio-political inclusion, social

welfare and economic equity for the majority of her cit-

izens, a country risks not attaining durable or civil peace

but an unstable institutional and constitutional peace.

5. International Intervention and the Quest for

Durable Peace

The historical causes of conflict in South Sudan

(categorized as 'new war') may seem intractable [34]

but the internal causes of regular post-settlement

violence suggest that statebuilding priorities retain ma-

jor elements of the structure of political power that

undergird the historical past of the RSS [49]. In

prioritizing this statebuilding, the LPPs in the RSS are

undermining durable peace in the country.Schomerous

and Allen's incisive review of the LPP in the RSS

reached the same conclusion ([30] p. 10). International

peacebuilders use the orthodoxy approach of the LPP:

prioritizing internationalization of the RSS by habit-

uating new political norms that tend to reflect con-

ditions and benchmarks of global governance insti-

tutions, promoting values like accountability, trans-

parency, separation of powers and elections. To sustain

liberal peace in the RSS, however, the National Demo-

cratic Institute (NDI) recommend that these inter-

ventions would have to consider concomitantly more

emphasis on "better access to services that leads to

improvements on the quality of life and guarantee peace

dividends" to marginalized and politically excluded

groups ([50] p. 71).

Table 1. Key areas of conflict addressed by international interventions.

Reform of justice and

security institutions

Culture of justice, truth

and reconciliation

Good governance Socioeconomic

development

Reintegration of

demobilised soldiers is

insufficient

Uncertainty about the

future and false

expectations

North/South disparities,

and intra-South

marginalisation

Status of the Three

Areas. International

attention diverted from

the Three Areas.

Undeveloped police and

justice systems

Hardening of ethnic

identities

Tensions around

centralisation and weak

structures at State levels

Migration of armed

pastoralists (this has not

featured in 2005);

discontented and under-

employed youth

Incomplete disarmament

among the population

Unresolved issues of

access to natural

resources

Lack of representation Returnees want access to

resources. Return

destabilies communities

Source: ([51] p. 43).

Table 1 shows the orthodox approaches of multilateral

interventions like the UN and bilateral (largely, the US)

promotion of liberal peace. The bolded areas of inter-

vention in post conflict Sudan are indicated on the

figure including the following: reintegration of soldiers,

development of police and justice systems, addressing

tensions around centralization/weak state structures

and the reintegration of returning refugees do dom-

inate the LPP in the RSS. However, these peacebuilding

endeavour must be pursued at the same time with felt

needs of the local communities if peace is to be sus-

tained. By comparing what international peacebuilders

pursue, what the Government of the RSS pursues and

the funding priorities of the main actors of peace-

building, we discover a gap between the international

objectives of legitimating the new state and the actual

local needs for sustainable peace. As Roland Paris

rightly warns, while "immediate democratization and

marketization" (stable market democracies) of war-

shattered states is good wisdom, hastily resorting to

this process is likely to be counterproductive: "market

democracy is not the miracle cure for internal conflict".

Political and economic liberalization is an inherently un-

settling process. It can instead aggravate social ten-

sions and undermine the prospects for stable peace in

the fragile post-war conditions typical of countries just

emerging from civil war. Good wisdom dictates that

post-conflict peacebuilding begins with the estab-

lishment of a network of domestic institutions that are

capable of dealing with the unfettered effects of

democratization and marketization, as well as the grad-

ual phasing in of political and economic reforms at the

appropriate time. For this to be effective, peacebuilders

must refrain from the unrealistic view that war-torn

states can be rehabilitated over night ([29] p. 14).

Figure 1. Funding priorities of the RSS (GoSS) versus funding priorities of international peacebuilders.

Source: ([51] p. 3).

Figure 1 shows how peacebuilding funding to some

basic services such as water and education easily

elude international intervention in post conflict Sudan,

despite the felt local need of access to these services.

When this figure is cast against the wider Government

of South Sudan (2010) budget, security accounts for

35% of the country's expenditure, basic services like

health and education account for 7% and 4% respec-

tively and rural development accounts for 3.4% of the

budget [18]. From the perspective of the emancipatory

approach to liberal peace, the RSS was increasingly

being set for relapse into violence because of the lack

of peace dividends and adequate social welfare among

marginalized and rural communities emerging from

conflict. Returnees expected better levels of services,

non discrimination along tribal lines (or Dinka

domination) and deconcentration of development in

Juba. Without these, and as predicted by Afro-

barometer [51], the local masses have been constantly

anticipating violence. Politicians have continued to

develop power bases centered on ethnic identity which

eventuated into the crumbling of the current existing

negative peace as of 15 December 2013.

International intervention into peacebuilding in

Sudan has largely been a top-down process aimed at

replicating westernity without regard to local context.

The current LPP approaches highly prioritize cen-

tralized urban political institutions over heterogeneous

local needs and preferences, which retard the bringing

about of peace that the citizenry wish for themselves

leading to authoritarian peace that narrows down

political participation of citizens in elections. To guar-

antee durable civil peace in the RSS, Oliver Richmond

suggest that orthodox peacebuilding must depart from

the LPP and focus on "how one can move beyond

hegemonic, authoritarian peace towards an everyday

notion of peace sensitized to the local as well as the

state and the global… and resting on a just social

order and solidarity" ([40] p. 109).

6. The Local Context of Social Welfare Exclusion

and the LPP in South Sudan

Afrobarometer's survey on what legitimizes a demo-

cratic society showed that 89% of respondents pointed

to basic needs provision (water, food and shelter) while

75% want "democracy to deliver … education, ... more

strongly ... they insist on regular elections, majority

rule, competing political parties or freedom to criticize

the government" ([52] p. 2). Similarly, a survey of

Southern Sudan by the NDI reported that the move for

secession from Sudan is "to avert domination of Arabs

… and … that independent Southern Sudan will be

more prosperous" ([53] p. 7). This implies that the

fragility of the democratic institutions in the RSS that

translates into frail liberal peace is wanting from the

perspective of delivering immediate improvements in

the socio-economic sphere.

Afrobarometer's survey of nineteen African states

undergoing peacebuilding in 2008, found out that 66%

of the populace saw their government's economic

policies as not benefiting, but instead worsening the

standards of living of the poor. Also, 50% of survey

respondents opined that their local government insti-

tutions were illegitimate, using revenues for private

gain rather than providing public services [54]. This

suggests that in a country recovering from conflict like

the RSS, the attainment of durable peace can tend to

be fragile.

In a bid to graduate from an orthodox to an eman-

cipatory approach that leads to durable peace in the

LPP, it has been suggested that governments that have

weak institutions must concentrate on providing public

services such as security in poor neighbourhoods and

in local markets. Also, the government in such a

situation should concomitantly assess what needs con-

stitute, as well as what local populations' perception of

peace dividends is [55]. This implies that international

intervention in South Sudan's LPP would best yield

durable peace if it supports the country to efficiently

respond to services needed by the most vulnerable of

the local masses in the short and long term.

A foreign peacebuilding actor in the RSS conducted

a survey using 67 focused group discussion sessions

and a sample of 700 persons representative of all

states, locations, tribes, religions, genders and age

groups from March to June 2011 on two issues: Firstly,

on the preference of the local masses as to the anchor

of peacebuilding among Democracy, Development or

both. Secondly, on what democratization agenda

should be pursued in peacebuilding. Participants over-

whelmingly (59.1%) preferred that in peacebuilding,

development (well being, improved standards of living)

should precede democracy (elections); 37.7% preferred

democracy to development whereas 3.2% preferred

that both democracy and development be pursued

simultaneously in the LPP. While those who preferred

development thought of democracy as politics and an

urban affair, those who believed in democracy defined

it in terms of the socio-economic dividends it may offer

in post-conflict times [56]. This resonates with the view

that the narrow definition and support for liberal peace

by the international community in line "with the over-

arching neoliberal economic paradigm and failure to

embrace an inclusivist approach to peacebuilding"

works against "effective reconstruction, growth and

development" ([57] p. 192). A primary-school-edu-

cated, Christian male in Juba for example, said "with

democracy, government will hear the cry of the people

and then bring development." Democracy was further

thought of as a way to handle tribalism, nepotism and

corruption that make public service institutions

inefficient and ineffective ([58] p. 15). The Second sur-

vey question on which priorities public services must

focus on in peacebuilding showed that: as a first,

second and third preference for peace dividend,

education constitutes 24.9%, 32.8% and 21.8% of the

whole sample surveyed. In general, access to edu-

cation is the second significant measure of expected

peace dividend in the RSS. It is only second to access

to water as the first, chosen by 27.5%, 14.6% and

19.5% of the survey respondents as their first, second

and third preference in public service provision if the

LPP in is to yield durable peace. In general, healthcare

provisioning features as the third public service

provision that should underpin durable peace in the

country.

Figure 2. Local preferences for peace dividends in the RSS.

Source: ([57] p. 17).

The data presented in figure 2 above corroborate a

joint survey of the RSS by the London School of

Economics (LSE) and the Partners Achieving Change

together (PACT)—a development organization. The

LSE/PACT study concluded that better access to social

services guaranteed through infrastructural devel-

opment and improved quality of life would be the

most remarkable aspects of any durable peace in

South Sudan [30]. But how should social welfare be

initiated and sustained for South Sudan's most ven-

erable groups? A religious leader in Raja County,

South Sudan puts it thus: "information and knowledge

is desperately needed for us to become informed

citizens" ([30] p. 71). This is because as argued

below, education does not only improve the quality of

civic engagement but also the quality of life for the

educated and of the community in which he or she

lives as a whole.

7. Formal Education and Liberal Peace in South

Sudan

Formal schooling and training in conflict trans-

formation sensitizes a society to the inequities of the

system to facilitate intergroup dialogue, healing and

reconciliation, and nurturing the idea or capacity for

peace through integrated schools having curricula

related to community relations, vocational training and

community development at primary and post primary

vocational levels [41]. The need for education to help

citizens to contribute to quality participatory gover-

nance has been avidly expressed in South Sudan [30].

It has been made clear that restricted access to

education or an inappropriate curriculum such as the

Arabization or Islamization of Southern Sudanese

schools [4,8–9,11], has led to the deterioration of inter-

ethnic relations [42], created an unskilled, corrupt, and

Dinka dominated civil service [18], making liberal peace

unstable in the country. Although the United Nation's

International Children's Emergency Fund's (UNICEF)

current Peace Education initiative in South Sudan

organizes workshops in mediation, negotiation, conflict

management and non-competitive dialogue, it is a top-

down process that helps in resolving immediate and

proximate causes of violence and not the structural

causes in rather abstract ways [42].

Peacebuilding education should rather be a bottom-

up process in which pupils of primary school age are

incentivized (through provision of meals at school, for

instance) to keep them at school, where they will be

reoriented to attitudes of peace. In a limited top-down

process, international peacebuilders should support

the RSS to build primary schools and post-primary

schools, teacher training colleges and vocational insti-

tutions so as to support durable peace. It is a process

founded on the experiences and opportunities to

augment the capacity for wellbeing among a highly

unskilled and unemployed South Sudanese youth by

providing them with immediate and relevant voca-

tional training that facilitates entrepreneurship, trade

and higher incomes that incentivize them to avert

proclivity to war. As an indispensable factor, peace-

building education should be immediately incor-

porated into current orthodox democratization and

free market institutionalization of the current LPP in

Sudan in order to actualize the emancipatory ap-

proach to the LPP that results in durable civil peace.

8. Access to Primary Education and the

Durability of Liberal Peace

After the CPA the number of pupils enrolled in primary

school increased from about 700'000 to 1.6 million.

However, the the RSS does not yet have the capacity

to keep up with the demand for education. Ad-

ditionally, donor support for education remains highly

insufficient through reconstruction programmes in the

country [58]. UNICEF estimates that in Sudan 70% of

children aged between 6 and 17 have never been to

school, 1 out of 10 pupils complete primary school

and less than 2% of the population have completed

primary schooling [58]. Worse still, a 2009 assess-

ment revealed that 96% of all teachers in South

Sudan have no formal training [59]. The lack of

access to education is captured in figure 3 below in

which school pupils in Yei, Jonlei state are seen sitting

on makeshift benches under a tree.

Figure 3. Pupils studying under a tree.

The picture above tells the tragic story of the acute

lack of space for teachers and classrooms for learning.

Wandera, an adult learner in Kuol, South Sudan who

thinks that education will preclude war in the country

asserts that: "Education is very, very important for

peace. If you are educated you will be able to know

what peace is, you will be able to educate people

about reconciliation, forgiveness and coming together

to solve problems". While equating education to

peace, respondents were unanimous that "an edu-

cated individual will be able to think and act well, put

his or her education to good use for development and

will have an open-mind" (Jacob, Interview, Dengnhial,

11 May 2013). According to the North-South Institute,

a combination of peace, civic and citizenship edu-

cation will instill a sense of responsible citizenship that

"fosters a culture of peace and peacebuilding through

conflict mitigation, resolution and reconciliation. Civic

education seeks to build an understanding of the

democratic system based on notions of civic and

human rights. Citizenship education attempts to teach

an awareness of rights and responsibilities and instill

respect for others' rights and viewpoints" ([60] p. 1).

Figure 4 below shows Dengnhial primary school pupils

appealing to the SPLM/A to turn war policies into

development projects.

Figure 4. Calls for the transformation of war policies into development policies.

Reychler Luc holds that formal education facilitates

sustainable peace in three ways that are relevant to

the South Sudanese context, if the curricula are

designed to foster community relations and com-

munity development [42]. Firstly, primary education

would be a forum for effective interethnic commu-

nication. Considering that about 66 ethnic languages

are spoken in South Sudan [26] , the use of English

as a common language will serve as a good medium

for fostering and nurturing interethnic communication.

Secondly, it helps dismantle sentimental walls related

to perceived domination by the Dinka or other forms

of groupings such as the SPLM. Increased access to

primary schooling takes away despair from victims of

social exclusion because it nurtures individuals with

requisite skills for future political participation and in

the long run, solves political tensions. Hannah Bol, in

Kuol, asserted that "Now that schools have been

opened, everyone has seen that education is im-

portant and that they need to come, and that war and

guns are not the future!" [26]. Thirdly, formal primary

schooling in integrated schools promotes an inte-

grative political climate [42]. The government of the

RSS currently runs on the basis of exclusive circles of

patronage and marginalization [46]. Participation in

governance would therefore, become skill-based with

the introduction of formal education.

9. Vocational Education, Peace Dividends and

the Durability of Liberal Peace

This study has established that there is a strong

correlation, almost a favourable causal link between

the provision of peace dividends (schooling, health

services, jobs, higher living standards, social devel-

opment) and the durability of peace. "The lack of

livelihoods opportunities for youth and the potential

for creating and exacerbating tensions and relapse to

violence" in post war states has also been noted ([49]

p. XVII). This has been recorded especially in Lakes,

Warrap, Jonglei and Upper Nile States, which are the

most conflict-affected regions in South Sudan. In the

survey conducted by the NDI on what locals in South

Sudan preferred as peace dividends, some said "If we

are educated…we would not so much think of

government to do for us everything;" "we would

create our own project and work on our own roads

but we do not have the skills so we really need

education to be the priority here" ([60] p. 9). One

respondent told us that "Giving us education is like

teaching us how to fish, and help ourselves instead of

perpetually depending on others" (Joseph, Jonglei,

interview of 20 May 2013).

This suggests that for international peace building

interventions to solidify peace, the RSS must be sup-

ported to create an enabling environment for young

people's livelihoods and/or employment [62].

Considering the very low literacy levels in South Sudan,

the setting up of rural craft schools in carpentry,

masonry, pottery, and agriculture and institutes for

electricity and electronics, maintenance, production

engineering, dress making, nursing, clerical studies are

necessary if durable peace is to be attained. For our

intent, vocational studies help academically less able

students, instilling technological knowledge related to

some particular function, craft and trade [62]. The

following figure is a framework showing how vocational

education can bring about peace dividends to sustain

peace.

Figure 5. The links between vocational training and peace dividends.

In the past, vocational training has been criticized

as a financially costly policy to implement, being of

lower value to academic or general education in terms

of the low income it attracts and the false probability

that it can guarantee quicker employment [62].

Nowadays, vocational education is seen as training

that facilitates the acquisition of specific vocational

skills for a lifetime that would manifest in entre-

preneurship, poverty reduction and the integration of

idling young people [in South Sudan] into the working

world of the informal or private sector [63,64].

In practice, vocational education would train the

workforce for self-employment and raise the pro-

ductivity of the informal sector [63]. The availability of

skills would attract more foreign direct investments,

modernizing South Sudan and promoting hetero-

geneous communities that facilitate interethnic inte-

gration.Vocational training is analogous to some form

of social engineering: transforming unemployed youth

to find employment, providing poor segments in

society with a rising income and improved living

standards and supplying to a community emerging

from the destruction of war, middle level technicians

such as, nurses, midwives, plumbers and brick layers

[61]. This is why vocational education is considered

socially useful work, which would help citizens develop

stronger awareness of the contribution of their work to

the wellbeing of society [62]. When social welfare

development for all is triggered through the extension

of access to formal schooling, the democratization and

institutionalization of the free market that yield fragile

authoritarian peace, constitutional peace and insti-

tutional peace graduate into an emancipatory approach

that addresses social injustices to yield durable civic

peace.

10. Conclusion

This study has found that the deeply rooted causes of

relapse to violence in South Sudan are historically

situated on ethnic segregation orchestrated by the

Anglo-Egyptian rule of the then Southern Sudan. This

dual rule left the area bereft of public goods, social

welfare institutions or solid economic development

outcomes. This segregation extended to political

exclusion as at independence, of more than 900

positions of postcolonial administration, people from

the three states of southern Sudan only got appointed

into 8 [21].

Shortly, after independence, restricted access to

social welfare, especially formal education informed

ethnic domination over or the exclusion of Southern

Sudanese in the realm of political participation. Con-

sequently, the incomprehensible nature of the CPA

that legitimized the Dinka's domination of the SPLM/A

government caused the exclusion of significant local

actors from the peace deal. Subsequent political par-

ticipation has further undermined the search for

durable peace. Because most of the liberal peace

building in independent South Sudan fails to imple-

ment projects that simultaneously strengthen demo-

cratic institutions as well as addressing the deep

rooted causes of relapse to conflict, for example the

lack of social welfare institutions that should lead to

peace dividends, the liberal peace that is this far

instituted or constituted is indeed, fragile.

Surveys conducted by Afrobarometer [52] and the

NDI [60] indicating local preference for the immediate

delivery of formal education, health and other basic

needs (clean water) over democratization, suggest

that the Liberal Peace Export to South Sudan is

divorced from local context, making the transposition

of liberal peace projects ineffective and making liberal

peace fragile in the country. This asymmetry of

information on what constitutes need for durable

peace between international peacebuilders (principal)

and the South Sudanese citizens and locals (agent)

has exacerbated ethnic marginalization and made the

institutional installations of the LPP faulty. This

dovetails with the failure of neoliberal peace project in

post-conflict Sierra Leone [56].

The issue of marginalization translates to lack of

services (like water, health and education) against

areas/peoples in the Jonglei and Blue Nile states.

These areas are also lagging behind in terms of

representation in political structures. The role of the

State in regulating such disparities has been minimal

or even negative. It operates on the basis of exclusive

circles of patronage and marginalization. Margin-

alization plays out as the stick and patronage as the

carrot within the context of social welfare exclusion

and inclusion among different ethnic groups [45].

Although the emancipatory approach is considered

impractical in the LPP, this research recommends the

provision of primary education and post-primary

vocational education as a policy implementation path

to actualize the emancipatory approach to the LPP in

South Sudan.

A low level of female education in the RSS

translates into the inability to control birth rates,

implying continuous growth in population and in-

sufficient consumption. Many households in the RSS

are already "living on a sub-sustainable level, due in

part to an uneven distribution of resources, but also

because in many regions (…) population has out-

grown essential resources". Among various methods

identified by the United Nations International Con-

ference on Population and Development (ICPD),

September 1994, Cairo, Egypt, and applicable to the

RSS are the: (1) empowerment of women and girls in

the economic, political and social spheres (2) removal

of gender inequalities in education and (3) integration

of family planning in synergy with other efforts to

improve mother and child health [64]. Poverty is

perpetuated and exacerbated by poor maternal

health, gender discrimination and lack of access to

birth control. This calls for the need to prioritize the

advancement of human development for women and

for all victims affected by violence and insecurity as

well as the creation and implementation of a national

strategy for human development so as to support

peacebuilding and its sustainability, advance the

human development process, enhance the needs of

children, the elderly and all victims of conflict ([27] p.

6). Research evidence suggest an inverse relationship

between levels of female education, and birth rate: an

educated woman is more likely to make better use of

existing health care services for both preventive and

curative health services, "to accept medical advice

and to make timely recourse to modern health care

facilities, greater identification with the outside world,

more social confidence at handling officials and

willingness to go out of the home for services" ([65]

p. 20, [66]).

Additionally, sustainable environmental governance

will mitigate the impact of climate change and permit

the government to cope with increasing pressure on

natural resources so as to ensure a sustainable future

for current and returning populations.

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Appendix 1. List of Abbreviations.

CPA Comprehensive Peace Accord

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

EFA Education for All

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GoSS Government of South Sudan

HDI Human Development Index

HIV Human immuno virus

ICPD International Conference on Population and Development

IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute

IPC Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

LPP Liberal Peace Process

LSE London School of Economics

NDI National Democratic Institute

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

PACT Partners Achieving Change together

RSS Republic of South Sudan

SSCCSE South Sudan Centre for Census Statistics and Evaluation

SPLM/A the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

TVET Technical and Vocational Education and Training

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UN United Nations

US United States

UNICEF United Nations Children Emergency Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development