Criminal Court, both acts that went against states'
sovereignty.
In the East Asian debate on human security, the
instrumentalist concept is the mainstream one. Ac-
cording to this view, states are instruments (but not
the only ones) of human security and thus national
security is also important for human security [4,37,38].
Barry Buzan echoes East Asian logic by criticizing the
reductionist notion of human security [39].
This is why in the East Asian debate human se-
curity is seen as threatened especially in the context
of state collapse [37,38]. The Japanese sponsored UN
Council for Human Security reveals its pro-state
orientation by placing a special focus on people on
the move, that is, people who cannot attain security
via the protection of their own states. With the con-
cept of human security, national security also receives
new justifications: "when we focus on the security of
the human persons, of the individuals, we're making
sure that state security and state sovereignty are
effectively implemented to help, to protect, to
promote the welfare, the well-being and the dignity
security of their own people …" [40].
A derivative of the debate on the relationship
between national and human security is the question
of the relationship between sovereignty and the
principle of non-interference on the one hand, and
human security on the other. If states, especially
authoritarian ones, present threats to human security,
most Western approaches claim that sovereignty
should not be allowed to restrict activity (especially by
democracies) to guarantee human security. However,
if states are a crucial instrument of human security as
is often believed in East Asia, sovereignty should not
be compromised. These two views are the first main
alternative strategic premises of human security. The
fact that an intrusive Western interpretation was
perhaps more prominent originally meant that the
concept of human security got a slow start in East
Asia. Despite the activity of the Japanese (and Korean
and Philippine) government and the former Thai
foreign minister and former ASEAN Secretary General,
Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, accepting the concept of human
security, it has not been easy for East Asian intel-
lectuals, let alone for governments [40]. According to
Paul Evans, "East Asia is resistant to concepts of
security that, in normative terms, have the potential
to erode traditional concepts of sovereignty" [41].
The human security concept that East Asia sym-
pathizes with the most is one where sovereignty
cannot be compromised, as it is an instrument of
national security and thus an important element in
human security: "the human security concept is a
rather comprehensive concept, but it will not be in
competition with the issue of state sovereignty. In
fact, it is making the state sovereignty more
meaningful" [40]. This deviation from the Western
discourse is understandable taken the differences in
historical experiences of East Asia and the West.
While the last big war in Europe was diagnosed as a
result of extreme nationalism and thus security was
associated with lowering state borders, in East Asia,
the two biggest wars (Vietnam and Korea) were
experiences where intervention and interference mag-
nified the impact on humans of the war. In these
differing historical contexts it is understandable that
the Western concept of peace and human security
prescribes the lowering of borders, while the East
Asian prescription is to the opposite [42]. If we go
further back in history, we also encounter the impact
of colonialism on the East Asian interest in the pro-
tection of sovereignty. The hesitance of East Asian
countries to accept Western concepts that could
legitimize Western interference in the domestic affairs
of East Asian nations is understandable against this
historical background. To some extent also Japan has
in some countries been perceived as a "semi-colonial"
power due to the history of colonialism and expan-
sionism during the Second World War, and as such
Japan has not been a perfect advocate for the
concept of human security.
While the disagreement on the role of the state as
an instrument of or as a threat to human security is
most distinct in political security issues, such as the
question of human rights, it is a relevant divide also in
questions related to economic human security.
However the divide between supporters and
opponents of income-distribution-sensitive develop-
ment strategies does not cut across the divide
between the West and East Asia. East Asian capitalist
as well as socialist discourse often criticizes Western
approaches that are not interested in the economic
security of the state or individual poor people, but
instead, are driven by individual greed. A good ex-
ample of the capitalist critique can be found in the
recent discourse on moderation in world affairs by
Malaysia's prime minister Najib Razak [43,44]. This
discourse does not emphasize only economic human
security of individuals, but that of the nation. Lee
Jones interprets this emphasis, not only in Malaysia,
but in the entire Southeast Asia, as an emphasis of
the interests of the class of capital owners. The
emphasis on the interests of the "national economy",
rather than economic human security of the poor,
simply shows the class foundation of the Southeast
Asian states [45]. Radical [46] and developmental
[47] socialist critique of the Western economic pol-
icies, again, criticizes both the class-based capitalist
economic prioritization as well as the neglect of the
economic human security of the poor in the West.
While in the former the subject of economic human
security was the class of the proletariat, in the latter,
despite of the original rhetoric (by Deng, for ex-
ample), not the worker, but the entire national
economy. In reality, however, the collectivist approach
to economic human security has made it easy for the
East Asian states occasionally also to neglect their
poor.
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