Journal of Human Security | 2013 | Volume 9 | Issue 1 | Pages 4-14

DOI: 10.12924/johs2013.09010004

ISSN: 1835-3800

Research Article

The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates: Exploring Recruitment,

Religion and Prisoner Vulnerability

Elizabeth Mulcahy

1

, Shannon Merrington

2

and Peter Bell

3,

*

1

Faculty of Arts, School of Political and Social Inquiry, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

2

School of Business, St. Lucia Campus, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

3

Faculty of Law, School of Justice, Gardens Point Campus, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland,

Australia; E-Mail: [email protected]; Tel.: +61 7 3138 7105; Fax: +61 7 3138 7123

* Corresponding author

Submitted: 24 January 2013 | In revised form: 11 March 2013 | Accepted: 12 March 2013 |

Published: 31 March 2013

Abstract: It should come as no surprise that prisons can become breeding grounds for

radicalisation and terrorism [1]. In many cases, extremist ideologies can flourish in prisons

through recruiting vulnerable inmates to follow their path. Despite being a popular topic among

researchers and policymakers, there still remain significant gaps in our understanding and many

unanswered questions. This paper provides an overview on prisoner radicalisation, specifically

exploring the role religion plays in prison and its link to radicalisation, prisoner vulnerability to

radicalisation and the radicalisation process. The paper also outlines the current debate

regarding where is the best place to house terrorist prisoners (isolation vs. separation). The

paper concludes by identifying the major gaps in the literature and offers concluding remarks.

Keywords: radicalisation; terrorism; prisons

1. Introduction

Prisoner radicalisation is not a recent phenomenon

and yet it is an area that is misunderstood and

theoretically underdeveloped. Throughout history

prisons have served as recruitment centres and

headquarters for ideological extremists (such as

Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler), where they used their

time behind bars to develop extremist philosophies

and recruit others into their mode of thinking [2].

Some of the most powerful criminal groups, such as

the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) in São Paulo,

Brazil, and the Commando Vemelho (Red Command)

in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil, originated in prisons [3].

Even so, since 11 September 2001 (9/11) several

individuals have been radicalised while being

incarcerated [4]. For example, prisoner Richard Reid

converted to Islam while incarcerated and when

released attempted to smuggle explosives on an

American airline flight in December 2001 [5].

Research suggests that many prisoners enter prison

with little or no religious calling, but over the duration

under a Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).

of their incarceration some adopt a faith (e.g. Islam)

[6]. However, of those who convert to Islam only a

very small percentage will turn into radical extremists

and an even smaller percentage will go on to join a

terrorist organisation [7]. An interesting study

conducted by the United States Senate, Committee on

the Judiciary, claim that roughly 80% percent of

prisoners within America turn to Islam when seeking

for faith behind bars [6]. This percentage translates

into a prisoner conversion rate of approximately

30,000 yearly [7].

Prisons by their very nature are hostile environments

(e.g. their isolation, cultural dissatisfaction, and

predisposition for violent tendencies) and as such are

susceptible to radicalisation extremists [8]. The 2009

World Prison Population List estimates that more than

9.8 million people are held in penal institutions around

the world and almost a third of these are in the

United States (USA, 2.29 million [9]). Even more

interesting, is that around 300 federal prisoners in the

US are serving sentences on terrorism-related charges

[8]. Terrorists jailed for criminal activities can thrive in

prison. Recruiters are able to spot, assess, and

encourage potential recruits to follow their path, drawing

from a constantly regenerating pool of candidates

[10,11]. Terrorist recruitment therefore "operates in

the deep underground of inmate subculture, between

the seams of prison gangs and extremist religions that

inspire ideologies of intolerance, hatred, and violence"

([7], p. 111). This type of environment allows terrorist

recruitment to flourish and can remain virtually

undetected. However, with the many advances in

technology, education and increased prison personnel,

these advances are making it extremely hard for

terrorist recruitment to remain undetected.

Prisoner radicalisation is a popular topic of

discussion; however, despite this recognition it has not

been fully explored and is a phenomenon that is not

well understood [1,12]. Furthermore, the process of

radicalisation in prisons in particular is poorly

understood because of the very limited information

researchers can obtain and this consequently

obstructs the development or improvement of

effective intervention methods [4]. Radicalisation, by

most accounts, can create the motivational or

cognitive preconditions for terrorism and therefore it

is important that we understand the prerequisite for

effectively combating terrorism [13].

An even more interesting and well-rehearsed

argument among researchers and practitioners is that

there has been an inadequate effort to define

radicalisation [14]. According to the Oxford English

Dictionary (OED) to radicalise is to: 1) cause

(someone) to become an advocate of radical political

or social reforms and 2) introduce fundamental or far-

reaching change [15]. Only recently has the OED

defined radicalisation. Radicalisation according to the

OED means: "The action or process of making or

becoming radical, esp. in political outlook" [15]. This

definition however, is extremely vague. Currently,

many organisations and scholars have come up with

their own definition; however, despite having some

similarities among these definitions there still lacks a

generic definition that can be used across all

disciplines and organisations. For example, the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark defines

radicalisation as "the phenomenon of people

embracing opinions views and ideas that could lead to

acts of terrorism" ([16], p. 8). This definition is very

subjective in that the radicalisation label applied to an

individual requires making an assessment about the

possible harm that an individual poses to another

party [13]. This definition is also very general, stating

that embracing any views/opinions can ultimately lead

to acts of terrorism.

In contrast, the Office of the Inspector General of

the US Department of Justice [17] claims

radicalisation is "the process by which inmates who do

not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme

views, including beliefs that violent measures need to

be taken for political or religious purposes" (p. 6).

Similarly, a review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons'

Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers by

the Department of Justice [17] states that

radicalisation "refers to the process by which inmates

…adopt extreme views including beliefs that violent

measures need to be taken for political or religious

purposes" (p. 6). This places more emphasis on the

cognitive (that views and beliefs justify violence) and

behavioural aspects (invitation to join a group) [13].

These definitions acknowledge that radicalisation is a

process and, unlike the definition by the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of Denmark, they state that

radicalisation is when an individual adopts 'extremist'

views, rather than simply adopting any opinions or

views. More recently, Fraihi [18] provides a succinct

definition which brings us closer to defining

radicalisation. In a recent essay Fraihi [18] states:

Radicalization is a process in which an individual's

convictions and willingness to seek for deep and

serious changes in the society increase. Radicalism

and radicalization are not necessarily negative.

Moreover, different forms of radicalization exist. This

concentration on the individual is indicative of the

focus of expert and government concern (p. 135).

An important distinction from the previous

definitions is that Fraihi [18] acknowledges that not all

radicalisation is negative and that radicalisation is not

always a precursor to terrorism. It also suggests that

radicalisation is an individual experience, whereby the

individual has to be 'willing' to undergo some deep or

serious change. Moreover, it is a psychological process

where individuals move towards more extremist

views [19].

As with radicalisation, terrorism also seems to be a

hard concept to define. Bilgi [20] outlines that this

stems from two main reasons: first, the term

5

terrorism is often interpreted as a pejorative concept,

meaning that those who are defined as terrorists are

said to 'deserve the blame', and secondly, terrorism is

used in highly emotive settings, meaning that

terrorism is often associated with violence, death, and

war. Although these reasons make it seem impossible

to define, it is not an impossible task to do so. For

example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force and

violence against persons or property to intimidate or

coerce a government, the civilian population, or any

segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social

objection" ([20], p. 12). While the European Union's

Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism defines

it as:

An intentional act which may seriously damage a

country or an international organisation, committed

with the aim of seriously intimidating a population,

unduly compelling a Government or an international

organisation to perform or abstain from performing

any act, seriously destabilizing or destroying

fundamental political, constitutional, economic or

social structures by means of attacks upon a

person’s life, attacks upon the physical integrity of

a person, kidnapping, hostage-taking, seizure of

aircraft or ships, or the manufacture, possession or

transport of weapons or explosives (cited in the

European Report [21], p. 6).

This is a legal definition of terrorism and, as such,

only partially overlaps with those used by academics.

There are hundreds of definitions of terrorism, often

emphasising a variety or feature of terrorism such as:

…its often symbolic in nature, its often

indiscriminate nature, its typical focus on civilian

and non-combatant targets its sometimes

provocative and retributive aims, the disruption of

public order and endangering of public security, the

creation of a climate of fear to influence an

audience wider than the direct victims as well as its

disregard of the rules of war and the rules of

punishment ([22], p. 6).

Many scholars have also come up with their own

definition of terrorism. For example, Jenkins [23]

defines terrorism as "the use or threatened use of

force to bring about change" (p. 3). Similarly,

Sederberg defines terrorism as "the threat or use of

violence for political purposes when such action is

intended to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a

target group wider than its immediate victim" (cited in

[24], p. 4). What is common among these definitions

is that terrorism includes the unlawful use of violence

with the aim of pursuing political or social objectives

that target enemies [20]. Also, many scholars agree

that the root cause or procurer of terrorism is not

radicalisation—simply because not all radicals become

terrorists [25].

Today, many governments, especially Western

governments (after the 9/11 attack) are concerned

about the threat of terrorism and are primarily

focused on what is called 'Radical Islam', a term

defined as "the politico-religious pursuit of

establishing—if necessary by extreme means—a

society which reflects the perceived values from the

original sources of Islam as purely as possible" ([26],

p. 3). However, it is important to note that 'Radical

Islam' does not always mean violence and cannot be

a sufficient cause of terrorism because most radicals

are not terrorists [13,25].

Overall, it is a well known argument among

scholars that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' definition of

radicalisation or terrorism that will satisfy all

disciplines and practitioners. The terms radicalisation

and terrorism are not precise concepts but rather

pejorative labels, and therefore it is not surprising that

there has been an inadequate effort to define them.

This paper begins by outlining the penal system

and the role of religion. Next, it outlines the different

types of recruitment methods employed by Islamic

extremist groups and discusses the process of

radicalisation. Finally, it concludes by examining an

ongoing debate as to whether terrorists should be

isolated, concentrated, or separated from ordinary

criminals.

2. Prision and Religion

Some prisons are notorious for being harsh

environments and for many inmates religion is one of

the methods used to cope with the prison

environment [27]. There is a belief, especially in

prisons in the US, that religion plays a profound and

necessary role in the creation and maintenance of a

moral and law abiding community [28]. For example,

religion is widely practised among the two million

prisoners in the US [28]. In the United Kingdom (UK),

the Muslim population has risen from 4,298 in 2000 to

10,672 in 2011 [29]. In the US approximately 350,000

inmates are Muslim (2003) and 80% of prisoners who

convert while in prison convert to Islam [8]. Islam

conversion in prisons is not a new phenomenon and

has been present in American prisons since their

inception in the early nineteenth century ([30], p. 90).

As Lofland and Stark [31] state:

The intellectual mode of conversion commences

with an individual, private investigation of possible

new grounds of being, alternate theodicies,

personal fulfilment, etc., by reading books,

watching television, attending lectures, and other

impersonal or disembodied ways in which it is

increasingly possible sans social involvement to

become acquainted with alternate ideologies and

ways of life. In the course of such reconnaissance,

some individuals convert themselves in isolation

from any interaction with devotees of the

respective religion (p. 376).

6

The literature on Islam in prisons is divided into

two schools of thought. One side indicates that

Muslim groups in prison are breeding grounds for

terrorists and the other side indicates that there is no

relationship between prisoner conversion to Islam and

terrorism [7]. Nevertheless, research shows that

religion plays an important role in prison security and

rehabilitation [7]. Clear and Sumter [27] administered

self-report questionnaires to 769 prisoners from 12

state prisons and found that increasing levels of

religiosity are associated with high levels of in-prison

adjustment and are also significantly related to a

smaller number of times inmates are placed in

disciplinary confinement for violating prison rules.

O’Connor and Perreyclear [28] also found that as

religion intensified prison disciplinary infractions

declined.

Similarly, Roy [32] argues that it makes more sense

to separate theology from violence:

'The process of violent radicalisation has little to do

with religious practice, while radical theology, as

salafisme, does not necessarily lead to violence'.

The 'leap into terrorism' is not religiously inspired,

but better seen as sharing 'many factors with other

forms of dissent, either political (the ultra-left), or

behavioural: the fascination for sudden suicidal

violence as illustrated by the paradigm of random

shootings in schools (the "Columbine syndrome")'

(Roy, cited in [19], p. 21).

However, there are also cases where religion has

been used to breed terrorists. For example, Kevin

Lamar James recruited more than a dozen fellow

prisoners into a terrorist group called Jam'iyyat Ui-

Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS) [7]. According to Ian

Cuthbertson, James convinced these men that his

interpretation of the Koran (called the JIS Protocol)

was the true version [10]. Members of JIS were also

recruited outside prison walls. Prospective JIS

members outside prison were instructed to blend into

society by marrying, getting a job, dressing casually

and needed to acquire two pistols with silencers and

learn how to make bombs [33]. These men were later

instructed to attack government agencies and military

stations throughout the US [10,33].

Another case is Jamal 'el Chino' Ahmidan who

embraced jihadist principles while serving time and is

the mastermind behind the 2004 Madrid train

bombings. Richard Reid, known as the 'shoe

bomber', who attempted to blow up an American

Airline flight between Paris and Miami in 2001, also

converted to Islam while serving time for a string of

muggings [7,34].

3. Vulnerability

When a person becomes imprisoned it is common for

the individual to go through physical and emotional

trauma that can make them more vulnerable to

recruitment. For example, in the beginning when an

individual is placed in jail, acute and chronic stress

factors can give rise to physical problems (e.g. sleep

disorders, loss of appetite, etc.) which can make the

prisoner more impressionable and vulnerable. At this

moment recruiters can enter into contact with the

new prisoner and evaluate their vulnerability and

likeliness to conform to their extremist group [35]. It

is also common for incarcerated individuals to

undergo unbalanced emotional states, such as states

of discontentment-excitement (hate, anger, doubt)

and states of discontent-relation (humiliation, fear,

sadness) [35]. This unbalanced emotional state is

ideal for possible recruiters to infiltrate the minds of

the impressionable.

There are also instances where an incarcerated

individual can lose their grip on their individual

identity. This is most prominent in foreigners who are

incarcerated in another country and do not speak the

language [35]. For instance, in the UK, the proportion

of foreign national prisoners has increased steadily

over the past decade. In the 1990s the foreign

population accounted for around 8% of the total

population and this increased to 13% by 2012 [29].

Many of these foreign prisoners have little knowledge

of the country, let alone the culture of the country,

and to top it off many do not speak the language

(having lived, worked and/or socialised in their

immigrant communities) [10], thus making the

individual more susceptible and vulnerable to

extremist groups.

One theory that can help us understand prisoner

vulnerability is the Transformative Learning Theory

(TLT) developed in the 1990s by Jack Mezirow. This is

a framework for understanding how change (learning)

occurs in individuals—more specifically, how adults

learn and adapt to new environments [36,37]. In this

instance we are using it to understand the behavioural

changes prisoners undergo while in prison and how

this learning transformation makes them more

vulnerable to radical extremists.

When an individual goes through some sort of crisis

(known as the transformative trigger), the individual

uses pre-existing habits to make sense of the event

[36]. However, when the individual cannot make

sense of the situation and resorting back to their

habitual ways fails to help them manage the event

this becomes known as a 'distortion'. As a result, the

individual reacts to the meaning distortion by

exploring new experiences and undergoing critical

reflection (e.g. turning to religion for guidance) [36].

These new perspectives help the individual cope with

the new environment by helping create new

behaviours, roles, and relationships [36,38]. Overall,

this transformation allows individuals to manage their

new environment, adapt to a new daily routine and

ultimately help an individual learn how to get past a

crisis [36]. However, going through a crisis can make

the individual easier to persuade and even more open

7

to manipulation and brainwashing [35], thus making

them very susceptible to extremist recruitment.

TLT can help shed light on the process and

precursors of prison radicalisation. Individual

radicalisation is not only associated with particular

socio-political contexts (e.g. prison) and personal

characteristics, but is also a combination of reflection,

knowledge acquisition and identity reassessment

[37,39]. As individuals begin to develop self-doubt or

experience confusion over identity or intense personal

debate, eventually a point is reached whereby the

individual comes to the realisation that their old

identity no longer exists and a new one must be

established [37]. Therefore, when radicalised

individuals socialise and are validated by other 'like-

minded' individuals, their transformation is reinforced

and the new identity is strengthened [37]. Ultimately,

those individuals who become violent, radicalised

inmates not only justify their actions but such actions

are also expected among the greater group of

radicals.

Hamm [7] interviewed intelligence officials in

Florida and California in December 2007 and found

that Florida prisoners were vulnerable to radicalisation

and terrorist recruitment. One official stated:

"radicalized prisoners are very aware that people

(authorities) are interested in radicalized prisoners.

They are very careful who they talk to in prison." The

official also noted that most inmates are radicalised by

other radical inmates and not by outside influence [7].

Overall, the majority of studies have focused on

demographic variables to look at the vulnerability of

individuals, mainly because they are much easier to

access than other variables [40]. However, many

empirical studies show that psychographic variables,

such as attitudes, emotions, preconceptions, and

motivations, seem to matter most regarding the

success rate [41].

4. Models of Recruitment

Recruitment plays a significant role in any terrorist

organisation. Individuals can use their expertise to

spot, assess, and encourage potential recruits to

follow the same path [11]. There are four different

models of recruitment:

the net

,

the funnel

,

the

infection

and

the seed crysta

l [40].

The net

pattern occurs when the target population

is equally engaged; for example, all members are

given the same book to read or are invited to a

meeting (see Figure 1a). In this instance, the target

audience is viewed as homogeneous and the group

can be approached with a single undifferentiated pitch

[40].

The funnel

pattern occurs when a recruiter takes

an incremental approach (characterised by

milestones) when he or she believes the target or

focal segment population is a prime target (see Figure

1b). This process requires an individual to have the

right motivation and undergo a significant

transformation in identity. Therefore an individual

starts at one end of the process and is transformed

into a dedicated group member at the other end [40].

The infection

pattern occurs when a trusted agent is

inserted into the target population to rally potential

recruits through direct personal appeals (see Figure

1c). Infection is likely to be successful where most

members are not extremists; this allows the infiltrator

to be able to convert selected members who are

dissatisfied [40]. Finally,

the seed

crystal pattern

occurs when the target is very difficult to access and

is very remote:

This may be compared to lowering the

temperature of a glass until the water inside it

cools and then ice crystals form as the seeds of

a complete freeze ([40], p. 79; see Figure 1d).

In terms of al-Qaida, this approach may be the

most successful in populations where open

recruitment is difficult, such as prisons.

The four different models of recruitment as

proposed by Gerwehr and Daley, 2006 ([40], pp. 73–

89) are shown in Figure 1.

5. Social Movement Theory and Recruitment

One of the most promising theoretical frameworks

applied to understanding radicalisation is Social

Movement Theory (SMT). Although SMT has been

used in social science for the past few decades, its

application to understanding radicalisation is in its

infancy. Della Porta [42] was one of the first terrorism

researchers to use the SMT concepts in her study of

violent and extremist Italian and German militants.

Della Porta [42] found that militant radicals were

bound together by personal ties and by their shared

activist experiences and participating radicals acted as

a self-reinforcing mechanism to drive radical activists

to become increasingly more radical.

Zald and McCarthy [43] define social movement as:

"A set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which

represents preferences for changing some elements of

the social structure and/or reward distribution of a

society" (p. 2). The idea behind this theory is that

"movements arose from irrational processes of

collective behaviour occurring under strained

environmental conditions (what sociologists would call

Strain Theory), producing a mass sentiment of

discontent. Individuals would 'join' a movement

because they passively succumbed to these

overwhelming social forces" ([44], p. 17). According

to SMT, members recruit others on a rational basis in

order to be effective and efficient. These recruiters

seek to identify individuals who are likely to agree to

participate and who are seen to be potential

individuals who can further their cause [44,45].

8

Figure 1. The four different models of recruitment as proposed by Gerwehr and Daley ([40], pp. 73–89):

a) The Net; b) The Funnel; c) The Infection; d) The Seed Crystal.

Brady et al. [45] explain the process of recruitment

as one of 'rational prospecting', meaning that

recruiters follow a strategy for seeking out individual

prospects that demonstrate the greatest 'participation

potential', and have conceptualised the process as

having two stages: 1) using information to find

prospects; and 2) getting to 'yes' which is outlined in

Figure 2.

In the first stage, the recruiter seeks information

regarding the target individual (such as past activities

the individual has been involved in). Also, the recruiter

assesses whether or not the individual has

characteristics (such as political interests or concerns

about political politics) that might predispose them to

take part in their extremist activities [45-47]. Overall,

a recruiter wants as much information as possible

regarding the potential recruit, especially involving the

individual’s political engagement [45]. However, this

information is not easily accessible; the amount of

information obtained will depend on the relationship

developed between the recruiter and the recruit.

Figure 2. Process of recruitment.

In the second stage the recruiter needs to get a

positive result (i.e. the individual recruit accepts and

becomes an active member). In order to successfully

achieve this, the recruiter may entice the recruit with

various gratifications or incentives [45]. This is

particularly true when the recruiter has control over

punishments and rewards because the more power

the recruiter appears to have the more likely it is that

the recruit will join the cause [45]. In addition,

having a relationship (preferably a close relationship)

will help leverage the cause, unlike approaching a

complete stranger. Prisoner radicalisation often

operates like street gangs where prison gangs are

generally drawn along racial and ethnic lines.

Prisoners prior to incarceration who are affiliated with

a certain gang may therefore naturally gravitate

towards similar gang organisations in prison where

members have each others’ backs [2,48]. Prison

gangs know that prisons have limited resources and

as a result they flourish within prisons despite the

best efforts of corrections officials—and extremist

gangs are no exception [49].

Hamm [7] worked with the US Correctional

Intelligence Initiative (CII), a program to prevent

potential acts of terrorism by inmates in the US. The

CII accessed 2,088 state and local correctional

facilities in the US and Hamm [7] found that

radicalisation is developed on the prison gang model

and prisoner radicalisation cannot be separated from

the prison gang problem. Gang members were seen

to be crossing racial lines, joining forces to create

larger groups and some crossovers involved

supremacists joining militant Islamic groups [7].

9

"Broadly defined, prison gangs are an 'organization'

which operates within the prison system as a self

perpetuating criminally oriented entity, consisting of a

select group of inmates who have established an

organized chain of command and are governed by an

established code of conduct" ([50], p. 371). Many

prison gangs use intimidation and violence which is

usually directed at outsiders to control their prison

environment [51].

Another study by Ungerer [48] interviewed 33 men

convicted on charges of terrorism by the Indonesian

courts in 2010. One man interviewed (Sonhadi)

explained that terrorist convicts would band together

and form something akin to a 'shadow government' in

prison: "They often pool their available resources to

ask for better cells, better food and other small

luxuries. They'd also run small businesses in prison,

from selling top-up cards for mobile phones to setting

up food stalls selling rice, cooking oil and sugar" ([48],

p. 12). There is also prestige associated with terrorist

convicts and many convicts regard them with respect

because of their willingness to lay down their lives for

religion [48]. A number of men interviewed also

stated that they have elevated status in society after

serving time [48]. It is not known if this is a broadly

accepted practice across all non-western prisons, but

it was evident in Ungerer's 2011 research on the

radicalisation of inmates within the Indonesian prison

system.

6. Process of Radicalisation

Some researchers reject the notion that radicalisation

can be understood by a sequence of fixed stages (e.g.

Sageman [52]) while others view radicalisation as an

orderly series of stages with terrorism being the final

destination [29]. In 2007, the Intelligence Division of

the New York Police Department (NYPD) published a

study, Radicalization in the West: The home-grown

threat, which outlines a simplified radicalisation

model. In this report it identifies that 'jihadist'

ideology is the key driver of radicalisation and

suggests four stages to explain the process of

radicalisation: pre-radicalisation, self-identification,

indoctrination and jihadisation stages [19,29]. These

four stages are described as a 'funnel' through which

ordinary individuals' religious beliefs become

progressively more radical and this once ordinary

individual becomes a terrorist [29].

The first stage, pre-radicalisation, occurs when

individuals are placed in environments that allow them

to be receptive to extremism [2]. This can be driven

by either intrinsic or extrinsic motivations. Intrinsic

motivation could be the result of a personal

crisis/trauma, experiences of discrimination and/or

alienation [2,53], or individuals may feel frustration

and dissatisfaction with their current religious faith

leading them to change their belief system [11]. On

the other hand, extrinsic motivations could be any

external factor (e.g. economic, ethnic, racial, legal,

political, religious, or social deprivation) that may

negatively affect an individual's attitude and belief

towards those implicated; leading to a change of faith

as the answer to the perception of deprivation they

are experiencing [11].

The second stage, self-identification, occurs when

the individual identifies him/herself with a particular

extremist cause and essentially changes his/her

religious beliefs or behaviours. These individuals begin

to construct a new character based on religion and

support for radicalised ideologies [11]. Also, certain

types of experiences, including the amount of

exposure to Islamic radicalism (e.g. jihadist videos),

are more likely to drive the convert from a conversion

to jihad. Guidance from supervisors and

encouragement to socialise with other 'like-minded'

individuals reinforces their new sense of identity and

commitment [14]. Therefore, overseas travel can have

a significant impact on the acceleration of the

radicalisation process [11]. Overall, the individual’s

needs and wants are increasingly removed and

replaced by those of the collective [14].

The third stage, indoctrination, furthers this

mindset and readiness for action [14]. It occurs once

a convert has accepted the radical ideology but may

be unsure or unfamiliar with how to participate. Part

of this stage is becoming an active participant. This

involves small-group and individual participation that

allows the recruit to know and recognise his/her

potential as a jihadist. What is critical in this stage is

the knowledge, skills, and leadership of senior figures.

This is a highly volatile and emotional stage for

recruits [14]. Confidence increases over time and the

individual's mind becomes saturated with radical

ideologies. The only solution to their problems is to

stand up for what they believe in through violent

action [11].

The final stage,

jihadisation

, is engaging directly in

terrorist activities (which can be violent or non-

violent) and is always done with the intention of

inflicting damage to the enemy: "During this stage,

role identification can be so strong as to completely

erase a sense of individualisation, thereby preventing

the possibility of the individual acting in their own self

interests by leaving the group"

([14]. p. 40). It is

important to note that these stages are not

chronological and individuals can skip stages, reaching

more violent actions quicker [53]. It also means that

individuals may stop the process and may not be fully

radicalised; conversely, even if they are fully

radicalised they will not necessarily carry out a

terrorist attack [29]: "Commitment is constantly

calibrated and re-recalibrated. Some drop out along

the way. A component of our counter-recruiting

strategy must be to always offer a safe way back from

the edge" ([23], p. 4).

Silber and Bhatt's [29] model represents

radicalisation as key transition points along a time

10

course beginning with ordinary-life individuals and

moving down a path where these individuals have

direct involvement in terrorist activities [13]. However,

this model lacks a full understanding of psychological,

organisational, and social processes that lead people

into radicalisation and their continuation towards

committing acts of terrorism [13].

7. Concluding Remarks

Radicalisation is a modern social phenomenon and

has displayed a substantial presence and complexity

as an emergent concept among disciplines [14]. Yet

there are still major problems surrounding the concept

of radicalisation, for instance defining the concept of

radicalisation and terrorism, collecting empirical data,

and building integrative theory [54].

There are many conclusions to be drawn from this

literature review. First, in order for experts and

scholars to gain a better understanding of the concept

of radicalisation a generic definition needs to be

established. From the literature provided above, it

seems that within the definition of radicalisation there

needs to be some reference to 'extreme movement

activity', that radicalisation is a 'process' over time,

and that 'not all radicals' or radical thoughts lead to

terrorist actions. Achieving clarity in defining the

concept of radicalisation and using appropriate

guidance from existing theories (such as SMT) will

help provide a platform for moving forward.

Second, it is important to acknowledge that each

one of us can potentially have opinions that others

would consider radical. This does not mean that

individuals, with criminals being no exception, with

radical thoughts are setting themselves up for

committing acts of terrorism. In reality, radicals and

radical ideas can play a positive role in communities.

For example many historical figures were considered

radical, such as Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela

and Gandhi. Even some violent radicals have been

seen to be acting in the name of the cause and that

their actions were just, such as the nineteenth century

American abolitionist, John Brown, who used violent

acts to fight slavery [55,56].

Third, radicals and individuals who undergo the

radicalisation process are different from ordinary

criminals. Hoffman [57] points out that both terrorists

and criminals employ violence to attain specific goals;

however, terrorists are motivated by ideological,

religious, or political gain, whereas criminals are

largely driven by material gain. Hoffman [57] also

suggests that terrorists believe they are fighting for a

cause. Finally, terrorists seek to impact and influence

a wider audience, while criminals do not generally

seek to disseminate terror to the general public [58].

Individuals who contemplate committing terrorist acts

(such as killing citizens) do so because they believe

that these actions are feasible and just [37]. However,

not all radicalisation is negative nor does it lead to

violence. For example, radical Islamic Puritanism

involves seeking greater religious purity (e.g. the

individual returns to a 'pure Islam') and separating

themselves from the influences of Western society

[18]. However, when making a distinctive difference

between individuals who accept radical ideas and

individuals who actively participate in violent

behaviour, there can be some blurring between

individuals since not all individuals who radicalise end

up participating in violent behaviour [37].

Fourth, a prisoner's vulnerability to radicalisation

does not end after release from prison. Many

individuals who leave prison lack basic support (e.g.

financial, emotional, or familial support) and where

support does exit, it is often provided by community

and religious groups. This gives extremist groups the

opportunity to disguise the organisation as a

legitimate support group where ties with former

prisoners can be maintained. One extremist group, al-

Haramain, maintained a database containing

information (including names, release dates and the

addresses to which the individuals would be released)

on over 15,000 prisoners who were classified as

vulnerable to the group’s message [58,59].

Fifth, it is important to acknowledge the ongoing

debate that surrounds two questions: 1) Where is the

most appropriate place to contain terrorists? and 2)

What is the most effective way of doing so? [12].

Researchers have suggested two possible strategies

for incarcerating prisoners: isolation or concentration.

The isolation method separates terrorists from each

other [5]. Neumann [5] indicated that this is the most

effective way to deter terrorists from ideologies

because their communication is hindered and

interaction with other terrorists has stopped. It also

makes it very difficult for terrorists to organise future

attacks because of the high level of security. The

second method is concentration, where all terrorists

are imprisoned in the one facility and specialised

resources (e.g. staff in the field of linguistics or de-

radicalisation training teams) are employed [12]. From

a resource perspective concentration is beneficial as

high security resources are only needed in a few

locations [12]. However, it can have problematic

consequences. For example, many jihad extremist

groups are made up of small, loosely affiliated cells

and teams. It is therefore possible that if such

individuals are concentrated their loose networks

could consolidate into a more cohesive and organised

form [12]. Overall, academics in the field of terrorism

(see [2,5,7,10]) agree that we may be facilitating

radicalism by integrating converted Islamic extremists

with criminals.

Finally, even though radicalisation does not always

result in violence, it is important to establish effective

methods to minimise 'the minority' of radicals who

have the potential to become violence. Some may

argue that only a small percentage of radicals actually

partake in extreme violence. However, it is important

11

to remember that the goal is to minimise violence,

regardless of how big or small the potential threat

may appear to be.

Scholars have suggested that the root cause of

prison radicalisation is related to overcrowding of

maximum security prisons, with few rehabilitative

programmes, and a shortage of chaplains to provide

religious guidance [7]. These root causes should be

explored in conjunction with topics such as inmate

subculture, extremist interpretations of religious

doctrines and how they lead to hatred and violence,

and the vulnerability of inmates to radicalism. Future

studies should also recognise and take into

consideration that radicalisation is a process that

occurs over time and that these stages are not

sequential and the speed in which an individual goes

through these stages can vary significantly depending

on individual circumstances. Ultimately, this

phenomenon needs to be explored more fully so we

can enhance our understanding and provide effective

solutions to minimise radicalisation in prisons [1,12].

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